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I. INTRODUCTION
Several times during the last ten years, Democratic legislators
proposed amendments to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) that
would prohibit businesses from including predispute arbitration
agreements in contracts involving employees.' The proposed
amendments failed to gain traction. Over this same period,
businesses continued to expand their use of arbitration agreements,
particularly in their relationships with consumers.2 The increased
1. See, e.g., H.R. 815, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 2282, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 2435, 107th
Cong. (2002); H.R. 3809, 108th Cong. (2004); H.R. 2969, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 3010, 110th
Cong. (2007); H.R. 5129, 110th Cong. (2008); S. 931, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 1873, 112th
Cong. (2011). Although some of the early bills were responses to the use of arbitration to
resolve statutory employment discrimination claims, drafters offered protection from
arbitration to consumers as well. See, e.g., Arbitration Fairness Act, H.R. 1873, S. 987, 112th
Cong. (2011). In addition, legislators proposed amendments to various statutes, such as the
Consumer Credit Protection Act, that would have had the same effect. See, e.g., Consumer
Fairness Act of 2003, H.R. 1887, 108th Cong. (2003). Almost none of these bills were reported
out of committee, and those that survived the committee step of the legislative process were
not voted on by the House or Senate. But see Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1394 (2010) (authorizing the Director of
the newly formed Consumer Credit Protection Agency to prohibit or impose conditions or
limitations on the use of arbitrations between a consumer and a financial services provider).
The Dodd-Frank Act allows limitations on arbitration if the Director of the Consumer Credit
Protection Agency determines, after conducting a formal study of the use of binding arbitration
agreements in the financial services industry, that such limitations are in the public interest
and for the protection of consumers. Id.
Professor Nancy Welsh described the Arbitration Fairness Act as "oft-introduced,
oft-ignored." Nancy A. Welsh, What is "(Im)Partial Enough" in a World of Embedded
Neutrals?, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 395, 405 (2010).
2. See Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, Arbitration's Summer
Soldiers: An Empirical Study ofArbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts,
41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 886 (2008) (finding clauses providing for mandatory arbitration
in 92.9% of employment contracts and 76.9% of consumer contracts); Linda J. Demaine
& Deborah R. Hensler, "Volunteering" to Arbitrate Through Predispute Arbitration
Clauses: The Average Consumer's Experience, 67 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 62-64 (2004)
(examining a different mix of industries and finding that 35.4% of consumer contracts
contained an arbitration clause, with 69.2% of financial services contracts containing such a
clause); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the
Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931, 934-36 (1999) (discussing the expansion of
arbitration into consumer agreements in relation to Supreme Court arbitration jurisprudence);
Zachary Gima, Taylor Lincoln & David Arkush, Forced Arbitration: Unfair and Everywhere,
PUB. CITIZEN, Sept. 14, 2009, at 1-2 (noting that 75% of the consumer industry companies who
took part in their survey included mandatory arbitration clauses in contracts); EDWARD
BRUNET ET AL., ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 129-30 (2006)
(discussing the expansion of arbitration agreements into every day consumer transactions with
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use of consumer arbitration agreements, together with growing
concern among the plaintiffs' bar and consumer advocates that
these agreements unfairly disadvantage consumers, led to the
reconfiguring of the legislation and its reintroduction in 2009,
and again in 2011, as the Arbitration Fairness Act (AFA).'
Unlike previous iterations of the legislation, which focused
only on the impact of arbitration agreements on employees,
these proposed AFA amendments to the FAA extend the
moratorium on predispute arbitration agreements to
4consumers.
This reintroduction comes at a good time for consumer
advocates and the plaintiffs' bar. With adverse Supreme Court
decisions and a Democratic president, successful adoption of the
financial institutions, service providers, and sellers of goods); Lauren Gaffney, The Circle of
Assent: How "Agreement" Can Save Mandatory Arbitration in Long-Term Care Contracts,
62 VAND. L. REV. 1017, 1024-25 (2009) (noting that mandatory arbitration of disputes
have become the norm in nursing home contracts); Mark Furletti, Mandatory
Arbitration Clauses in the Credit Card Industry, FED. RES. BANK PHILA., 4
(Jan. 2003), http//www.philadelphiafed.org/payment-cards-center/events/workshops/2003/
MandatoryArbitrationClauses012003.pdf (noting that mandatory arbitration clauses have
been adopted by "almost every credit card issuer" in the United States); Arbitration Clauses
Prevalent: By Using Your Card, You May Be Giving Up Your Right to Settle Disputes in Court,
CONSUMER ACTION NEWS, Spring 2007, at 5 (finding that 75% of surveyed cards required
consumers to settle disputes in arbitration).
3. H.R. 1873, S. 987, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 931, 111th Cong. (2009); see, e.g., Jonathan
G. Cedarbaum & David Montes, Efforts to Curb Arbitration are Gaining Momentum,




4. H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009). Although the 2009 AFA protected
franchisees, in addition to consumers and employees, the 2011 AFA sponsors dropped
the language protecting franchisees. Compare S. 931, 111th Cong. (2009) with H.R.
1873, 112th Cong. (2011). The AFA's introduction occurred even though the three
major providers of consumer arbitration services have voluntarily adopted
comprehensive rules designed to ensure that arbitration is fair to consumers. See AM.
ARBITRATION ASS'N, CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL (2008), available at
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22019 (providing extensive protections to ensure that
consumers have access to information about arbitration, that consumers have an
equal voice in selecting a neutral arbitrator, that fees are reasonable, and that the
right to representation is ensured); JUDICIAL ARBITRATION & MEDIATION SERVS.
(JAMS), CONSUMER MINIMUM STANDARDS (2009), available at
http://wwwjamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMS-Rules/JAMSConsumerMin-Stds-
2009.pdf (providing standards for consumer arbitrations including availability of all remedies
at law, prohibitions on one-sided arbitration clauses that bind only the consumer, right to
have the dispute heard in consumer's hometown, right to a written arbitrator decision,
right of consumer to participate in choosing the arbitrator, reduced fees, and right to
representation); NAT'L ARBITRATION FORUM, ARBITRATION BILL OF RIGHTS 3-10 (2007),
available at http://www.adrforum.com/users/naf/resour ces/ArbitrationBillOfRights3.pdf
(committing to adhere to a series of principles including preservation of remedies provided by
law, reasonable fees, convenient hearings, reasonable discovery, access to information, and
arbitrator neutrality).
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AFA would appear more likely.! As in prior years, the legislation
was proposed to address dissatisfaction with the arbitration
process stemming from the increased use of arbitration
agreements by businesses in their relationships with consumers
and other parties who have little leverage when negotiating
arbitration agreements.6 Yet the draconian antiarbitration
5. Although passage would seem more likely, the legislation's current focus on
eliminating predispute arbitration agreements between one-shot and repeat players may well
be too extreme to garner sufficient support for passage. Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and
Arbitration: The Case Against Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between
Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 449, 470 (1996) [hereinafter Incentives
& Arbitration] (reporting the sharp divide among legislators over whether the Act should pass);
Garen E. Dodge, Ban on Mandatory Predispute Arbitration Again Proposed in Congress,
MARTINDALE.COM (May 27, 2011), http/www.martindale.com/civil-rights-law/
articleJackson-Lewis-LLP_1289464.htm. As of July 2011, the 2011 version of the bill has
fourteen sponsors in the Senate and seventy-one sponsors in the House. See Bill Summary
& Status, S.987 Cosponsors, THOMAS.GOv, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/
z?d112:SN00987:@@@P (last visited Aug. 29, 2011); Bill Summary & Status,
H.R.1873 Cosponsors, THOMAS.GOV, http1/thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112
:HR01873:@Ca@P (last visited Aug. 29, 2011). Although the 2009 version of the bill had
fifteen more sponsors in the House and six additional sponsors in the Senate when
compared to the 2007 version, the bill nevertheless died in committee. See Bill Summary
& Status, H.R.1020 Cosponsors, THOMAS.GOV, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/
z?d111:HR01020:Ca)W@P (last visited Aug. 29, 2011); Bill Summary & Status, S. 931
Cosponsors, THOMAS.GoV, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:SN00931:@@@P
(last visited Aug. 29, 2011). Previous versions of the bill also did not make it out of
committee, despite popular expectation. S. 931: Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009,
GovTRACK.COM, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=slll-931 (last visited Aug.
24, 2011); see David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1247, 1250 (2009) (suggesting incorrectly that the passage of the 2009 AFA was a
significant possibility). Wayne Outten, a plaintiffs attorney and arbitration critic, said, on
a panel addressing the 2009 AFA, that the act had a "50-50 chance of passage." CPR
News, 28 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 122, 134 (2010); Michael W. Fox, It's Not
EFCA, Now It's FAN, JOTTINGS BY AN EMPLOYER'S LAWYER (Apr. 24, 2009, 9:49 AM),
http://employerslawyer.blogspot.com/2009 04_01_archive.html ("[Oldds are in favor of
[the 2009 AFA's] passage."). But see Aditi Bagchi, The Myth of Equality in the
Employment Relation, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 579, 612 ("Even with a Democratic
Congress and President, it seems unlikely that a bill that would so drastically alter the
employment law landscape will actually become law in the near future.").
The recent Supreme Court decision Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772
(2010) changed some opinions. See, e.g., Philip J. Loree, Jr., Stolt-Nielsen Delivers a New FAA
Rule-And then Federalizes the Law of Contracts, 28 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 121,
125 (2010) (stating that if the Supreme Court reverses the Ninth Circuit, as it went on to do,
"this likely will increase the odds that the Fairness Act will be passed"); Why the Supreme
Court's Decision in Rent-A-Center v. Jackson Matters, GSMLABORCOUNCIL.ORG (June 22,
2010, 12:33 PM), httpJ//www.gsmlaborcouncil.org/node/5551 ("This decision will spur efforts in
Congress to pass the Arbitration Fairness Act."); USSCt: Arbitrator's Authority Over Claims of
Unconscionability, ALASKAEMPLoYMENTLAW.COM (June 28, 2010, 2:27 PM),
http://www.akemplaw.com/wild/2010/06/28/usset-arbitrators-authority-over-claims-of-
unconscionability/ ("It is possible that the result here may push Congress into taking action on
the long-pending Arbitration Fairness Act.").
6. See Deepak Gupta, New Poll: Americans Say "No Thanks" to Binding
Arbitration, CL&P BLOG (May 21, 2008), http://pubcit.typepad.com/clpblog/2008/05/
new-poll-americ.html (noting that many Americans do not want binding arbitration
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measure, inaptly named the "Arbitration Fairness Act," does not
remedy arbitration's shortcomings, but instead eliminates
predispute arbitration agreements between most repeat and one-
shot players.! The AFA misses the mark primarily because it
overstates the case against arbitration, rendering the legislation
unpalatable to corporate and business interests, as well as many
consumer and employee advocates.' Because corporate and other
clauses or do not know about such clauses); Robert Berner & Brian Grow, Banks vs.
Consumers (Guess Who Wins), Bus. WK., June 16, 2008, at 72 (discussing allegations
that National Arbitration Forum (NAF) consumer debt collection practices
systematically favor credit card companies); Don Sniegowski, Arbitration Fairness Act:
Franchisees Pushing Congress to Pass Bill, NUWIRE INVESTOR (May 11, 2009),
http://www.nuwireinvestor.com/articles/arbitration-fairness-act-franchisees-pushing-
congress-to-pass-bill-52946.aspx. A variety of articles online at The Consumerist-and from
other news outlets-provide ample illustrations of the dissatisfaction with the arbitration
process. See, e.g., Alex Chasick, Forced Arbitration: You Lose, Now Pay For Our Lunch, THE
CONSUMERIST (Apr. 28, 2009, 10:29 PM), http/consumerist.com/2009/04/forced-arbitration-
you-lose-now-pay-for-our-1unch.html [hereinafter Forced Arbitration]; Alex Chasick, "We Build
in Middle Class Neighborhoods Because You Can't Afford to Fight Us", THE CONSUMERIST
(Apr. 29, 2009, 10:22 PM), http/consumerist.com/2009/04/we-build-in-middle-class-
neighborhoods-because-you-cant-afford-to-fight-us.html [hereinafter We Build in Middle Class
Neighborhoods] (detailing consumer frustration with arbitration clauses in mortgage
contracts); Carrick Mollencamp, Dionne Searcey & Nathan Koppel, Turmoil in
Arbitration Empire Upends Credit Card Disputes, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 2009, at A14,
available at httpJ/online.wsj.com/article/SB125548128115183913.html ("[A] congressional
subcommittee, which began an investigation last year to study the fairness of
mandatory arbitration, concluded . . . that the current arbitration system is 'ripe for
abuse' [and that] [alrbitration 'as operated by NAF, does not provide protection for
those consumers.'"); Robin Sidel & Amol Sharma, Credit Card Disputes Tossed Into
Disarray, WALL ST. J., July 21, 2009, at Al (reporting that the American Arbitration
Association announced it will stop participating in consumer-debt-collection disputes until new
guidelines are established).
7. Incentives & Arbitration, supra note 5, at 476; Dodge, supra note 5.
8. See Shirley M. Hufstedler & William H. Webster, Arbitration Under Siege,
NAT'L L.J. (Sept. 20, 2010) (arguing that passage of the 2009 AFA would abolish
arbitration as a viable option for many disputes); Letter from Int'l Inst. for Conflict
Prevention and Resolution to Sen. Russell D. Feingold, Sen. Patrick J. Leahy, Rep.
John Conyers, and Rep. Henry Johnson (Nov. 19, 2009), available at
http/images.magnetmail.net/images/cientsfllCPR/attach/ArbitrationFairnessActof2009Letter
.pdf (highlighting the flaws in the AFA, including its elimination of the "benefits of
arbitration in many categories of contracts"); John Allgood, Will the Arbitration Fairness
Act Survive the Midterm Election?, BE NEUTRAL, http://www.digitalsmarttools.com/
eGODR/ArbitrationFairnessAct.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2011) (calling for more
empirical data to support the claims of the proponents of the AFA and citing two
studies that dispute the idea of disparate outcomes in arbitration for consumers or
employees); Press Release, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Voters Strongly Back
Arbitration, New Poll Shows (Apr. 2, 2008) (quoting Lisa Rickert, President of U.S.
Chamber ILR, as saying that the AFA will eliminate arbitration and leave many
consumers without recourse); Edna Sussman, The Unintended Consequences of the
Proposed Arbitration Fairness Act, FED. LAW., May 2009, at 48, 50 (explaining that
the AFA will result in too many disputes going to court); Lew Maltby, Model
Arbitration Act (on file with author); RICHARD D. FINCHER, ET AL., ASS'N FOR CONFLICT
RESOLUTION, AN EXAMINATION OF THE ARBITRATION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2009, passim (2009),
available at http/www.acrnet.org/uploadedFiles/Publications/FinalReport%2012-1-09.pdf
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interests are likely to be successful in opposing the bill in its
current form, the real changes needed in arbitration, i.e., changes
to permit consumers with low value claims to have their cases
heard in some forum, will not occur.
Perhaps not coincidentally, members of Congress proposed
the AFA at a time when the Supreme Court's decisions
repeatedly ensured the enforcement of the liberal federal policy
favoring the use of arbitration as a dispute resolution
[hereinafter ACR TASK FORCE REPORT] (criticizing the reach of the AFA's proposals).
9. Greg Beck, Return of the Arbitration Fairness Act, PUB. CITIZEN CONSUMER
LAW & POLICY BLOG (Apr. 27, 2011, 6:54 PM), http://pubcit.typepad.com/2011/04/
return-of-the-arbitration-fairness-act.html (claiming that the Arbitration Fairness Act
of 2011 "has faced heavy opposition from business interests"). Some consumer relief may
come through passage of the Dodd-Frank Act. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1394 (2010) (authorizing the
Consumer Finance Protection Bureau (CFPB) to regulate arbitration agreements "for the
protection of consumers"). This legislation governing the financial services industry takes
a less radical approach to arbitration, enabling the newly established CFPB to study the
use of arbitration and implement reform if the reform is in the public interest and for the
protection of consumers. Id. ("[CFPBI shall conduct a study of. . .the use of agreements
providing for arbitration of any future dispute between covered persons and consumers in
connection with the offering or providing of consumer financial products or services.")
Although the law authorizes the agency to ban or limit predispute arbitration agreements
between consumers and covered financial providers for consumer finance products and
services, it does not mandate the elimination of arbitration. Id. Additional provisions in
the Dodd-Frank Act concerning residential mortgages and home equity lines of credit as
well as in securities law disputes also do not eliminate arbitration as a dispute resolution
option. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 921(o) (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78(o). In addition, incremental relief
has come through the Franken Amendment, which bars defense contractors from
requiring their employees to arbitrate Title VII discrimination claims, tort claims for
sexual assault and harassment, wrongful imprisonment, and other similar claims. 48
C.F.R. § 222.7400-.7404 (2010). This Act may not provide much of an indication of
Congress's views on predispute arbitration agreements, however, because the legislation
was designed to address a particularly egregious situation in which a defense contractor
stalled the arbitration of an employee who had sued the company for damages after she
was raped and assaulted while working for the company. See John R. Parkinson, Naked,
Sore, Bruised, and Bleeding: Alleged US. Contractor Rape Victim Fights for Day in Court,
ABCNEWS.COM (Oct. 7, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/
halliburton-employee-jamie-leigh-jones-testifies-senate-rape/story?id=8775641 (explaining
the difficulties faced when the victim tried to bring her case to court); Jim Garrettson,
Franken Amendment Passes: GooCon Says Ouch, GOVCONWIRE.COM (Feb. 17,
2010), http://www.govconwire.com/2010/02/franken-amendment-passes-govcon-says-ouch/
(pinpointing the Jamie Leigh Jones case as the "spur" of Franken's "legislative thrust").
Additional bans on predispute arbitration agreements have been proposed in foreclosure
relief legislation and other mortgage-related legislation. See Joseph L. Barloon, Anand S.
Raman & Darren M. Welch, Consumer Protection Provisions in the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, SKADDEN.COM, http://www.skadden.com/
newsletters/FSR_AConsumer_- ProtectionProvisionsinDodd-Frank.pdf (last visited
Aug. 17, 2011) (detailing the Dodd-Frank Act's Title X, which created the new Bureau of
Consumer Financial Protection, and Title XIV, which prohibits abusive loan practices). It
is unclear whether these incremental changes suggest an embrace of the greater changes
the AFA proposes; it is more likely that these changes are based on particularly
problematic factual situations that have captured public attention.
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mechanism.o One recent decision abandoned almost thirty years
of precedent to authorize parties to arbitrate unionized
employees' statutory discrimination claims." Another decision
dealt a blow to consumers' ability to pursue their claims,
precluding arbitrators from ordering parties to use class
arbitration when the parties' arbitration agreement is silent on
that issue.12 A third decision, Jackson v. Rent-a-Center West,
empowered parties to delegate greater responsibility to the
arbitrator. In Jackson, the Court decided that the parties can
delegate to the arbitrator, if they use clear and unmistakable
language, the power to decide whether an arbitration agreement
is unconscionable." Finally, the Court appears to have placed the
nail in the coffin on consumers' ability to pursue class processes
when bound by an arbitration agreement in AT&T v.
Concepcion.14 In that case, the Court decided that the FAA
preempts a court judgment that prohibits enforcement of class
action waivers when agreed to by consumers with low value
claims." Taken together, these cases reinforce the Court's
philosophy that parties' arbitration agreements are enforceable,
and that, with few exceptions, parties should be able to structure
arbitration as they see fit, including prohibitions on the use of
class action procedures.
Why is there a disconnect between the judicial
interpretation of the FAA and the legislative view of arbitration?
A partial answer may be found in the ongoing public campaign
against arbitration that Public Justice and Public Citizen, among
others, are waging. 6 Despite substantial empirical evidence to
10. See, e.g., 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1461 (2009); Jackson, 130
S. Ct. at 2776 ("The FAA .. . requires courts to enforce [arbitration agreements] according
to their terms."); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1773
(2010) (stating that the Supreme Court has "on numerous occasions" upheld the purpose of the
FAA-ensuring that arbitration agreements are enforced according to the terms of the
agreement) (citing Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489
U.S. 468, 478-79 (1989)); Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C., v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581 (2008).
11. See Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1464-69.
12. See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1775. Some critics, as well as Justice Ginsburg,
question whether this holding will extend to consumer arbitration. Id. at 1783 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting) ("Second, by observing that 'the parties [here] are sophisticated business
entities,' and 'that it is customary for the shipper to choose the charter party that is used
for a particular shipment,' the Court apparently spares from its affirmative-authorization
requirement contracts of adhesion presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.").
13. See Jackson, 103 S. Ct. at 2775-77 (concluding that the arbitration agreement
clearly stated that the arbitrator would have the authority to determine the
unconscionability of the clause).
14. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011).
15. See id. at 1744 (finding preemption when the claim was for $30.22).
16. See Fair Arbitration, ACCESS TO JUSTICE, PUB. CITIZEN (2011),
http://www.citizen.org/Page.aspx?pid=2512; Mandatory Arbitration, PUB. JUSTICE (2011),
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the contrary, groups like Public Citizen receive considerable
press attention for anecdotal reports about unfair or expensive
arbitration processes in which consumers have participated."
These reports garner legislative attention" and may, perhaps,
have encouraged legislators to propose a poorly conceived answer
to a longstanding question-how the Federal Arbitration Act
should be amended to adapt to the modern use of arbitration.
What legislation is necessary to reform arbitration? While
arbitration's critics attack the process on a variety of grounds,
the most pressing issue in consumer arbitration, in the wake of
recent Supreme Court decisions, is the lack of a viable forum for
consumers with low value claims." Wireless phone companies,
banks, computer sellers, and cable companies routinely integrate
arbitration agreements with class arbitration waivers in their
boilerplate language in contracts with consumers.20 For most
http-//www.publicjustice.net/Key-Issues-Cases/Access-ToJustice/Mandatory-Arbitration.aspx.
Both sites contain links to various reports and stories that illustrate this point. See also
NACA's Arbitration Fairness Day is April 29, MD. CONSUMER RIGHTS COAL. (Mar. 17,
2009, 8:25 AM), http://marylandconsumers.wordpress.com/2009/03/17/nacas-arbitration-
fairness-day-is-april-29) (detailing NACA's Arbitration Fairness Day).
17. Nonprofit Group Pans Arbitration, Hous. CHRON., May 20, 2002, at 3D; Jennifer
Rose Hale, U.S. Supreme Court Ruling Supports Credit Card Company Policies Requiring
Arbitration, Fox Bus. (Apr. 27, 2011, 4:30 PM), http/www.foxbusiness.com/personal-finance/
2011/04127/supreme-court-ruling-supports-credit-card-company-policies-requiring; James
Vicini, Supreme Court Rules for AT&T in Arbitration Case, REUTERS (Arp. 27, 2011, 4:30 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/27/us-att-arbitration-idUSTRE73Q4N520110427; see
also We Build in Middle Class Neighborhoods, supra note 6 (demonstrating that
consumer protection groups and victims of unfair arbitration practices are actively
reaching out to Congress).
18. See, e.g., Press Release, Public Citizen, Congress Must Undo Damage of U.S.
Supreme Court's Latest Anti-Consumer Decision: Statement of Public Citizen Attorney
Deepak Gupta on the Introduction of the Arbitration Fairness Act (May 17, 2011),
available at httpJ/www.citizen.org/pressroomredirect.cfm?ID=3346.
19. See Darren P. Lindamood, Redressing the Arbitration Process: An Alternative to
the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 291, 310 (2010) (stating
that preventing consumers from signing predispute arbitration agreements "will result in
less access to a remedy for plaintiffs with small claims" and that "when employers or
manufacturers are not bound by a predispute arbitration agreement, they can refuse to
agree to arbitrate small claims with the knowledge that the high cost of litigation will
prohibit the plaintiff from obtaining counsel.").
20. Verizon, Sprint, AT&T, and T-Mobile use class action waivers in their customer
arbitration agreements. See T-Mobile Terms & Conditions, T-MOBILE.COM,
httpJ/www.t-mobile.com/Templates/Popup.aspx?PAsset-FtrFtrTermsAndConditions&print
=true [hereinafter T-Mobile Terms] (setting the effective date at July 24, 2011); Important
Service/Product Specific Terms, SPRINTPCS.cOM, https://manage.sprintpes.com/outputl
enUS/manageMyPhoneandPlan/ChangePlans/popLegalTermsPrivacy.htm (last visited
Aug. 17, 2011) [hereinafter Sprint Terms]; Customer Agreement, VERIZONWIRELESS.COM,
http://www.verizonwireless.com/b2c/globalText?textName=CUSTOMERAGREEMENT&j
spName=footer/customerAgreement.jsp (last visited Aug. 17, 2010) [hereinafter Verizon
Agreement]; AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011) (describing
AT&T Mobile's arbitration agreement); Wireless Customer Agreement, ATT.COM,
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consumers, potential claims arising from such services involve
relatively small amounts of money.21 Were class actions
available,2 2 consumers with low value claims might be able to
vindicate these kinds of complaints.23 The consumer's acceptance
of an arbitration agreement, however, precludes recourse to those
forums (in most cases). Although arbitration services providers
limited the costs to the consumer of participating in arbitration,2 4
http://www.wireless.att.com/learn/articles-resources/wireless-terms.jsp (last visited Aug.
27, 2011) [hereinafter AT&T Terms]; see also Gima, Lincoln & Arkush, supra note 2, at
11, 14, 16 (showing that 71% of banks, 44% of computer manufacturers, and 46% of cable
providers use arbitration clauses in their contracts); Stephen Landsman, Nothing for
Something? Denying Legal Assistance to Those Compelled to Participate in ADR
Proceedings, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 273, 279 (2010) (discussing self-protective
requirements in an unregulated market featuring adhesive conditions); Peter Rutledge,
Point: The Case Against the Arbitration Fairness Act, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2009, at 4,
7 [hereinafter Case Against AFA] (arbitration's deprivation of consumers' ability to bring
class actions is potentially problematic).
21. Case Against AFA, supra note 20, at 7 (calling for more empirical research to
determine whether the adoption of class action waivers is as widespread as consumer
advocates believe); see also Chang Sik Lim, Analysis of Various Provisions in Cell-Phone
Contracts, FAIRCONTRACTS.ORG (July 5, 2010, 3:27 PM), http/faircontracts.org/
content/analysis-various-cell-phone-contract-provisions-03-2010 (concluding that major
wireless companies include mandatory arbitration clauses in their contracts in
contemplation of their customers' small claims).
22. Some scholars suggest that a "small claims court carve out" would be an
adequate remedy for this problem. See Alan Kaplinsky, The Use of Pre-Dispute
Arbitration Agreements by Consumer Financial Services Providers, 1789 PLI/CORP 493,
516 (Apr. 2010). In deciding AT&T v. Concepcion, the Court may have offered some
support for this position. While not specifically addressing the small claims court carve
out AT&T provided, the Court nevertheless approved the AT&T arbitration provision as
providing sufficient opportunity for the consumers to vindicate their claims either
through bilateral arbitration or small claims court. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753.
23. See Laster v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 854-56 (9th Cir. 2009), rev'd
sub nom. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744 ("We held in Shroyer that a claim worth a few
hundred dollars did not provide adequate incentive for a customer to bother pursuing
individual arbitration. The $30.22 at issue here is even less of an incentive to file a claim.
As a result, aggrieved customers will predictably not file claims-even if the odds are that
after the letter-writing and arbitrator-choosing, they will get a $30.22 offer-thereby
'greatly reduc[ing] the aggregate liability' AT&T faces for allegedly mulcting small sums of
money from many consumers." (citing Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Network Servs.,
Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 986 (9th Cir. 2007))). The Searle Civil Justice Institute study of consumer
arbitration clauses, issued in 2009, found that 109 of the 299 arbitration clauses contained a
class arbitration waiver. SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INST., CONSUMER ARBITRATION BEFORE THE
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION: PRELIMINARY REPORT 103 (2009), available at
https://www.aryme.com/docs/adr/2-2-1235/informe-sealy-aaa-eeuu-2009-us-sealy-report-
aaa.pdf. The study found that all cases involving cell phone companies (five out of five)
and all credit card issuers' agreements (twenty-six out of twenty-six) contained class
arbitration waivers. Id. In other areas, such as automobile sales and home builder
contracts, the appearance of the waivers was closer to 50% or 60%. Id.
24. See Mark E. Budnitz, The High Cost of Mandatory Consumer Arbitration, 67
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 133, 136-37 ("If a consumer's claim or counterclaim [under the
AAA rules] is for less than $10,000, the consumer must pay half of the arbitrator's
compensation, but the consumer's responsibility cannot exceed $125. . . . If the claim or
counterclaim is for between $10,000 and $75,000, the consumer must pay one-half of the
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consumers participating in arbitration continue to pay some
filing fees and may also pay some portion of the arbitrator's fee.25
As a result, access to a dispute resolution process may prove
prohibitively expensive for consumers with relatively small
claims. If the consumer has not signed an arbitration agreement,
he or she might be able to find recourse in a class action process."
If bound by an arbitration agreement, however, until recently, a
consumer might find solace in class action arbitration, which
arbitrators often ordered if the parties did not place a class
arbitrator's fee, but not more than $375. . . . [Tihe fee is $2,250 for a claim between
$75,000 and $150,000, and $4,000 for a claim between $150,001 and $300,000."); id. at
141 ("When a consumer files a claim under the JAMS rules, she must pay a flat fee of
$125 and no more."); id. at 138-39 ("If a consumer files a claim [under the NAF rules] for
between $5,000 and $10,000, she must pay a minimum of $185.00 unless the parties agree
otherwise or applicable law requires a different cost allocation. For claims between $10,000
and $75,000, the cost to the consumer varies depending upon the specific amount of damages
alleged."). See Consumer Arbitration Costs, AM. ARBITRATION Ass'N, httpi/www.adr.org/
sp.asp?id=22039 (last visited Aug. 17, 2011) (stating that for claims under $10,000, consumer
is responsible for half the arbitrator fees up to a maximum of $125, and for claims between
$10,000 and $75,000, the consumer is responsible for half the arbitrator fees up to a maximum
of $375; consumers are not responsible for administrative fees); Consumer Arbitration
Policy: Minimum Standards of Procedural Fairness, JAMS, http/wwwjamsadr.com/
filesfUploads/Documents/JAMS-Rules/JAMSConsumer_MinStds-2009.pdf (last visited
Aug. 17, 2011) (stating that $250 is the maximum fee to be paid by a consumer when the
consumer initiates the arbitration, and that the corporation is to pay all arbitration fees
when the corporation initiates the arbitration); NAT'L ARBITRATION FORUM, CODE OF
PROCEDURE 10, 62-63 (2008) (stating that consumers who meet federal poverty standards
need not pay arbitration fees, and providing procedure for consumers to request waiver of
fees); NAT'L ARBITRATION FORUM, FEE SCHEDULE TO CODE OF PROCEDURE 3 (2008)
(stating that a consumer claimant pays the filing fee and half the hearing fee up to a
maximum of $250, and that a consumer-respondent pays half the hearing fee up to a
maximum of $250); Consumer Arbitration Fee Schedule, U.S. ARBITRATION & MEDIATION
MIDWEST, http://www.usam-midwest.com/images/ConsumerArbitrationFeeSchedule.pdf
[hereinafter USAM Fee Schedule] (stating that the consumer must pay a $125 filing fee
for claims less than $25,000 and $350 for claims equal to or greater than $25,000, as well
as one half of all other costs and fees if the claim is greater than $75,000).
25. See, e.g., USAM Fee Schedule, supra note 24. Interestingly, some businesses
have drastically altered the standard arbitration fee structure so that consumers pay
little or no fee. For example, AT&T Mobility (formerly Cingular Wireless), which provides
cellular services to over 80 million subscribers, gives subscribers with a dispute the option
of pursuing their claim in small claims court or arbitration. If the consumer chooses to file
an arbitration claim, AT&T Mobility reimburses the $125 AAA consumer filing fee and
pays all the costs of arbitration regardless of who wins. See AT&T Terms, supra note 20;
Sprint Terms, supra note 20; T-Mobile Terms, supra note 20; Verizon Agreement, supra
note 20.
26. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1773-75
(2010) (explaining that if a party does not agree to an arbitration clause, they cannot be
forced to adhere to the terms of one and they are therefore free to choose a different
means of resolving their issues); Carnegie v. Household Int'l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th
Cir. 2004) (noting that consumers with small claims can benefit from class actions
because "[tihe realistic alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but
zero individual suits, as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30").
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arbitration waiver in their arbitration agreements." The
Supreme Court's recent decision in AT&T v. Concepcion, in
which the Court held that the FAA preempts a state court
decision mandating that an arbitration agreement is
unconscionable if the consumer with a low value claim is not
permitted to proceed in a class arbitration, sounds the death
knell for the class arbitration process. Considered together with
the Court's Stolt-Nielsen decision, where the Court held that in
the absence of parties' explicit authorization of the use of class
action arbitration, the arbitrators may not order it, the Court
appears to have placed an insurmountable obstacle in the path of
consumer efforts to vindicate low-value claims."
With class action arbitration likely removed as an option for
consumers with low value claims who are bound by arbitration
agreements, the most pressing question in arbitration reform is
what to do about consumers with small claims who cannot afford
to bring those claims as individuals.29 Rather than attempt to
27. According to AAA's searchable class arbitration docket, as of July 2011, AAA is
administering 307 class arbitration cases. Searchable Class Arbitration Docket, AM.
ARBITRATION AsS'N, http//www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=25562 (last visited July 21, 2011).
28. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1710, 1753 (2011); Stolt-Nielsen,
130 S. Ct. at 1775. In at least one class arbitration case since Stolt-Nielsen was decided,
the arbitrator still ordered class arbitration even though the arbitration clause did not
directly address the issue. See Benson v. CSA-Credit Solutions of Am., Inc., No.
11-160-M-02281-08, at *3-6 (July 6, 2010) (Meyerson, Arb.) (on file with author) (finding
that, despite contractual silence on the issue, the parties involved intended to submit to
class arbitration).
29. One possible remedy for consumers is creating an exception to allow consumers
bound by arbitration agreements to proceed in small claims court. See infra note 22; Amy
J. Schmitz, Legislating in the Light: Considering Empirical Data in Crafting Arbitration
Reforms, 15 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 115, 117-18 (2010) (advocating that the "shoulds" of
the 1998 Consumer Due Process Protocol, including a guarantee of consumer access to
small claims court, be turned into legislative "musts"); Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P.
Miller & Emily Sherwin, supra note 2, at 890 (arguing that, because small claims court
may be just as inexpensive as arbitration, it is not clear that policy should favor the
arbitration of small-scale disputes).
As discussed previously, however, the small claims court option may prove
inadequate. Class processes, unlike small claims court, create an incentive for consumers
to bring the cause of action. See Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration
Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 28-31
(2000) (noting that class actions make possible "suits which otherwise would have been
logistically or economically impossible"); Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using
Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or
Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 79-81 (2004); S.I. Strong, The
Sounds of Silence: Are U.S. Arbitrators Creating Internationally Enforceable Awards
When Ordering Class Arbitration in Cases of Contractual Silence or Ambiguity?, 30 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 1017, 1050 (2009) (listing Judge Jack Weinstein's ten benefits of class actions,
including: streamlining of the pretrial phase; judges' familiarization with the litigation;
consistency of result for all injured parties; single action resolving the entire problem;
providing plaintiffs with enough capital to fight on a level field with the defense; enhances
the possibility of a global settlement; allows for a single, fair punitive damage amount;
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eliminate arbitration in its entirety, a better approach, and one
with greater likelihood of success in the legislative arena, would
be to amend the FAA to permit class action arbitration, or, at the
least, prohibit businesses from precluding class action arbitration
or class actions in court through the use of a predispute
arbitration agreement."o If the FAA were amended to address the
real inequities in the arbitration process (i.e., the use of class
action waivers), consumers as well as arbitration itself (as a
dispute resolution mechanism) would benefit."
This Article addresses the class action issue through the lens
of recent Supreme Court jurisprudence. Before the Court decided
Concepcion and Stolt-Nielsen, courts often disagreed about
whether a consumer's waiver of the right to pursue class actions
gives the court power to control fees; allows a single appellate panel to review the case;
and permits small claims to be brought where they otherwise would not); David S. Evans,
Class Certification, the Merits, and Expert Evidence, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 4 (2002)
(stating that the four major benefits of class actions include: a reduction of litigation costs,
an increased deterrent effect, economization of judicial resources, and affording a
convenient method for defendants to settle large numbers of related claims); Myron S.
Greenberg & Megan A. Blazina, What Mediators Need To Know About Class Actions: A
Basic Primer, 27 HAMLINE L. REV. 191, 207 (2004) (describing efficiency benefits of class
actions). Some courts agree. See, e.g., Muhammad v. Cnty. Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Del.,
912 A.2d 88, 99-100 (N.J. 2006) (explaining that "rational" claimants forego their rights
rather than pursue low-value claims); In re Am. Express Merchants' Litig., 554 F.3d 300,
320 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that the class action waiver cannot be enforced and
explaining that, in order to qualify as a class, the plaintiffs must show that the
recovery by any one individual would be so low as to render bringing an individual
action impracticable).
30. Why is the availability of class processes important? Professor Jean Sternlight
contends:
Many claims can be feasibly presented only by a class rather than on an
individual basis, despite the fact that some courts continue to enforce arbitration
and deny class actions in such impractical situations. Where plaintiffs can
establish that the prohibition on class actions would deprive them of any forum
in which to present their federal statutory claim by making that lawsuit
economically unfeasible, courts should refuse to enforce such a provision-either
by voiding the arbitration clause altogether, by holding the arbitration clause
inapplicable as to class claims, or by permitting plaintiffs to present their claims
in an arbitral class action.
Sternlight, supra note 29, at 103.
31. Studies reveal that consumer arbitration is a process that benefits both businesses
and consumers. See Peter B. Rutledge, Whither Arbitration?, 6 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 549,
556-60 (2008) (reviewing empirical data suggesting that win rates and perceived fairness
in consumer arbitration are comparable to or better than in litigation); SEARLE CIVIL
JUSTICE INST., supra note 23, at 6-16 (reviewing empirical data suggesting that consumer
arbitration is faster and cheaper than litigation with comparable win rates, and that
there is a lack of evidence for repeat-player bias); Sarah R. Cole & Kristen M. Blankley,
Empirical Research on Consumer Arbitration: What the Data Reveals, 113 PENN ST. L.
REV. 1051, 1062-70 (2009) (reviewing data from NAF consumer collections cases and
finding that arbitration frequently resulted in financial breaks for consumers, that most
consumers paid few or no fees in arbitration, and that the cases are generally resolved
quickly in arbitration).
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in court or arbitration was unconscionable.3 2 Following these two
cases, however, one would expect to see businesses altering their
agreements with consumers so that a class action arbitration
waiver is included. Under Stolt-Nielsen, arbitrators may not
order class arbitration based on an agreement that is silent with
respect to class arbitration." Under Concepcion, a court will be
unable to hold that a class arbitration waiver is unconscionable
(unless other aspects of the arbitration process are
unconscionable).3 4 Following Jackson, one would expect to see
those same businesses rewriting their arbitration agreements to
delegate to the arbitrator decisions about whether an agreement
to arbitrate is unconscionable. Although businesses have no
guarantee that an arbitrator will reject unconscionability
challenges more easily than would a court, one suspects that an
arbitrator, who wants to arbitrate and earns a salary from
arbitration, will be more inclined to find an arbitration
agreement enforceable than would a court. These cases,
considered together, show strong judicial support for arbitration
but, at the same time, an anti-class arbitration sentiment. As a
result, the class action waiver issue needs legislative attention so
that consumer arbitration may truly become a useful and
beneficial alternative dispute resolution process." If Congress
could address this issue effectively, the major problem associated
with consumer arbitration would be resolved.
II. CONSUMER ARBITRATION
Although critics lambast consumer arbitration as unfair to
consumers, numerous empirical studies of arbitration
demonstrate that consumer arbitration agreements typically
provide consumers with fair and affordable access to justice.36
32. See Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1108-09 (Cal. 2005)
(agreeing that class action waivers can be unconscionable while noting that other courts
disagree).
33. See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct., at 1775-76.
34. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746-47, 1753 (2011)
(holding that a court must look outside the class arbitration waiver to find the agreement
unconscionable).
35. As Professor Rutledge notes, addressing the class action waiver issue is "a more
calibrated solution" than a wholesale ban on predispute arbitration agreements. Case
Against AFA, supra note 20, at 7.
36. See Bradley Dillon-Coffnan, Revising the Revision: Procedural Alternatives to
the Arbitration Fairness Act, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1107-08 (2010) (noting that
monetary relief is slightly higher for individuals in arbitration, and 93% of consumers
using arbitration find it to be fair) (citing NAT'L ARBITRATION FORUM, THE CASE FOR PRE-
DISPUTE ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 2 (2004)); Erik J. Moglinicki & Kirk D. Jensen,
Arbitration and Unconscionability, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 761, 766 (2003) ("Consumer
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The absence of consumer arbitration, which would shift these
claims into traditional court processes," would effectively
eliminate many of these claims because the litigation process is
expensive and difficult to navigate without representation. In one
area, though, consumer arbitration agreements appear to
preclude access to justice rather than enable it. Contractual
provisions banning class actions or class action arbitration
effectively foreclose the prosecution of individual claims of low
value." Thus, an arbitration provision tends to be the end of the
road for a consumer with a low value dispute. That businesses
implement arbitration agreements with class action waivers for
the primary purpose of preventing class claims offers further
support for the argument that Congress should eradicate this
aspect of arbitration agreements."
Because class action waivers prevent many consumers from
pursuing their claims, and because courts often enforce these
waivers, legislation addressing the class action waiver issue is
necessary. This Section will review the current state of empirical
evidence on consumer arbitration and then focus on the impact of
consumer arbitration agreements on the availability of class
action procedures, whether in litigation or arbitration.
Ultimately, this Section will conclude that the primary objection
advocates ... have noted that arbitration provides a fast, fair, and affordable alternative
to litigation."); Richard L. Hurford, The Business Case for SMART Dispute Resolution
Processes, MICH. B.J., June 2010, at 42, 44 (stating that despite the pending AFA,
arbitration processes, "if appropriately designed, have been demonstrated to be a faster,
less expensive, and fair method of resolving employment disputes").
37. Case Against AFA, supra note 20, at 7.
38. See JOHN O'DONNELL, PUB. CITIZEN, THE ARBITRATION TRAP: How CREDIT CARD
COMPANIES ENSNARE CONSUMERS 43 (2007), available at http://www.citizen.org/
documents/ArbitrationTrap.pdf (discussing how consumers might not pursue their low-
value complaints outside of class action settings because attorneys probably will not take
their cases).
39. Even without empirical studies, there is a general sense that businesses utilize
consumer arbitration agreements to avoid class processes. In discussing businesses'
motivations for adopting these clauses as well as the benefits of class processes, Professor
David S. Schwartz has noted that:
[Arbitration may also displace class actions. By aggregating low-cost/low-stakes
or high-cost/low-stakes cases into a single high-cost/high-stakes case, class
actions can realize potential process-cost economies of scale that make them a
relatively inexpensive forum for the class members-both in terms of monetary
and information costs. Defendants' aggressive efforts to use mandatory
arbitration clauses as an escape from class actions provide a strong signal that
their primary concern is to deter claims, not to ensure that all claims against
them are aired more cheaply. While there is no doubt disagreement among some
mandatory arbitration supporters about whether class actions are arbitrable-and
the law remains unsettled-it is clear that at least some find the possibility of
getting rid of class actions as the primary virtue of mandatory arbitration.
Schwartz, supra note 5, at 1319-20.
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to consumer arbitration agreements is not that they fail to
provide justice to most consumers, but that these clauses preclude
access to justice for those consumers, typically with low-value
claims, who would only be able to pursue their claim if they join
with other consumers.
A. The Current State of Consumer Arbitration
The increased use of consumer arbitration in non-negotiated
agreements precipitated a call for empirical analysis of the costs
and benefits of consumer arbitration as an alternate means for
resolving disputes."o The working assumption of many
antiarbitration advocates was that a business-promulgated dispute
resolution clause must, by its very nature, be harmful to
consumers.4 Initially, empirical research seemed to bolster this
assumption.
In 2007, Public Citizen, a national non-profit consumer
advocacy group, issued a scathing report attacking the consumer
arbitration process.42 The Public Citizen report appeared to provide
evidence that arbitration is unfair to consumers.4 3 Academics and
arbitral organizations responded quickly, providing arguments and
statistics suggesting significant difficulties with Public Citizen's
analysis of the available empirical evidence." Ultimately, review of
the empirical evidence revealed that Public Citizen's (and others')
claims that consumer arbitration is inherently unfair to consumers
were overstated.45
40. See Paul B. Marrow, Determining If Mandatory Arbitration Is "Fair":
Asymmetrically Held Information and the Role of Mandatory Arbitration in Modulating
Uninsurable Contract Risks, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 187, 210, 212, 216 (2010);
O'DONNELL, supra note 38, at 13, 58-59 (discussing the rise in the use of binding
mandatory arbitration clauses in the late 1990's and then proceeding to analyze consumer
data).
41. See, e.g., Gima, Lincoln & Arkush, supra note 2, at 4 (calling for Congress to ban
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts because forced arbitration creates a "systematic
bias in favor of businesses").
42. O'DONNELL, supra note 38, at 13-15, 28-30, 43 (describing arbitration as a
secret process that is severely skewed in favor of corporations).
43. Id. at 28-30, 32, 39.
44. See, e.g., PETER B. RUTLEDGE, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM,
ARBITRATION-A GOOD DEAL FOR CONSUMERS: A RESPONSE TO PUBLIC CITIZEN 10-12 (2008)
(criticizing Public Citizen's data, methodology, and conclusions); Case Against AFA, supra note
20, at 4, 7; Bogus Attack on Arbitration Really about Plaintiffs' Lawyers' Right to Sue, INST. FOR
LEGAL REFORM (Sept. 27, 2007), http//www.instituteforlegalreform.com/component/ilrmedial
30/pressrelease/2009/384.html (arguing that arbitration really gives American consumers an
effective and cheap recourse to address their grievances); Walter Olson, Behind Those "Unfair"
Arbitration Numbers, OVERLAWYERED BLoG (Oct. 18, 2007), http/Avww.overlawyered.com/
2007/10/behind-those-unfair-arbitratio.html (arguing that Public Citizen's claims are
inaccurate and misleading).
45. Cole & Blankley, supra note 31, at 1052.
471
HOUSTON LAW REVIEW
But the Public Citizen Report generated interest in
conducting better empirical research of the consumer arbitration
process. Subsequent studies of consumer arbitration concluded
that, in the vast majority of consumer arbitrations, consumers
pay fewer fees than they would in court, obtain results faster
than they would in court, and win greater relief than they
would likely win in court.4 6 Although more empirical research
would obviously shed additional light on the issue, the
evidence from the research available does not support the
promulgation of the Arbitration Fairness Act as currently
written." Rather, it supports a narrow tailoring of the AFA to
address specific concerns, such as the increased use of class
action waivers." This section briefly examines studies
conducted following the issuance of the Public Citizen Report
to determine what evidence is available from which
subsequent assumptions can be made.
Cole and Blankley examined the same data set Public
Citizen used for its report but arrived at considerably different
conclusions than Public Citizen. Both studies evaluated the
34,000 NAF-administered California arbitration cases.49
Examination of the data uncovered that well over 99% of the
data set were collections cases, in which the consumer was the
defendant."o Thus, from the authors' perspective, the NAF data
46. See, e.g., id. at 1067, 1070-73 (finding that arbitration cases are typically
shorter in duration when compared to similar cases in California federal court and that
"[clonsumers [p]ay [flew or [nlo [flees" in reported NAF arbitrations); RUTLEDGE, supra
note 44, at 6-9.
47. See Case Against AFA, supra note 20, at 4 (explaining that data shows that
consumers are better off under a system with enforceable pre-arbitration
agreements).
48. See Amy Schmitz, Regulation Rash? Questioning the AFA's Approach for
Protecting Arbitration Fairness 28-29 (Univ. of Colo. Law Sch. Legal Studies Research
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 10-02, 2010) (arguing that while further research is
necessary, class waivers ought to be legislatively precluded); Case Against AFA, supra
note 20, at 7 (arguing that a "more calibrated solution" would be to eliminate class
arbitration waivers).
49. Cole & Blankley, supra note 31, at 1062-67 (finding that the Public Citizen
Report "draws the wrong conclusions from too little information"); O'DONNELL, supra note
38, at 13-15.
50. All but 15 of these cases were designated "collections" cases. Cole & Blankley,
supra note 31, at 1063 n.65. Collections cases are unlike other consumer cases. In a
collections case, the consumer is the defendant. Typically, there is no question that the
consumer owes the debt to the credit card issuer. RUTLEDGE, supra note 44, at 10-11. In
mediation, the consumer admits the debt and then typically works out a payment plan
with the issuer. Sarah Rudolph Cole & Theodore H. Frank, The Current State of
Consumer Arbitration, DiSP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2008, at 31; RICHARD M. CALKINS & FRED
LANE, MEDIATION PRACTICE GUIDE 6-10 (2008). In arbitration, though, the debtor will
likely lose, because he owes the debt. RUTLEDGE, supra note 44, at 10-11. In such
situations, all an arbitrator can do is enter an award against the debtor. Marrow, supra
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set was of limited value. It was useful primarily for drawing
conclusions about collections cases, not the consumer-initiated
arbitration cases that raise concerns among antiarbitration
advocates.
Although the data set is of little use as a critique of the
consumer-initiated arbitration process, some of our findings were
interesting-at least as they related to issues of consumer fees
and awards. The data showed that the vast majority of the cases
involved attempted collection of debt from a consumer (and thus
were initiated by a business)." In these arbitrations, most
consumers paid few or no fees.52 In all but five of the approximately
34,000 cases, the consumer paid under (and usually well under)
$500 in arbitration fees." In fact, the data showed that in 99.6% of
the cases, the consumer paid no fee at all.54 In addition, the data
revealed that arbitration cases reached conclusion much more
quickly than did similar claims filed in court."
Unfortunately, because Public Citizen studied primarily
collections cases, its study, and our subsequent analysis of it,
reveal little about consumer-initiated arbitration claims.
Fortunately, other studies of consumer arbitration examine
consumer-initiated arbitration and provide helpful information in
assessing the appropriateness of arbitration as a dispute
resolution mechanism for consumer disputes.
In 2004, for example, Ernst & Young published a study
about consumer arbitration.5 The results of this report suggest
that consumers fare extremely well in consumer-initiated
arbitration, prevailing in 55% of cases that reach decision and
"obtaining favorable results" in close to 80% of the cases
reviewed." In addition, the report contained the results of a
note 40, at 219-20. Thus, the win-loss record for consumers in these cases is not cause for
concern. Moreover, it mirrors consumer success in court collection cases. Hillard M.
Sterling & Philip G. Schrag, Default Judgments Against Consumers: Has the System
Failed?, 67 DENV. U. L. REV. 357, 360-61, 369 (1990) (finding consumers prevailed in
Small Claims and Conciliation Branch of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia
only 4% of the time, with the vast majority of cases being default judgments)
51. Cole & Blankley, supra note 31, at 1062-63.
52. Id. at 1067.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1072-73.
56. ERNST & YOUNG, OUTCOMES OF ARBITRATION: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF
CONSUMER LENDING CASES (2004). Public Citizen criticized Ernst & Young's report,
primarily because of its small sample size (226 respondents) and the representativeness
of the sample studied (limited to consumer-claimants). O'DONNELL, supra note 38, at
20.
57. ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 56, at 2, 9-10. These statistics include cases where the
parties reached a settlement satisfactory to the consumer or the case was dismissed at the
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telephone survey of twenty-six of the participants. The telephone
survey found that 69% of the respondents indicated that they
were satisfied or very satisfied with the process.
In 2006, Mark Fellows wrote an article in which, among
other things, he analyzed California's consumer arbitration
data." Fellows's analysis of the data revealed that consumers
prevailed in 65.5% of consumer-initiated cases that reached
decision.6 By contrast, consumer plaintiffs litigating contract
claims in the seventy-five largest American counties prevailed
only 61.5% of the time overall, and 60.9% of the time in bench
trials." Businesses prevailed in 77.7% of business-initiated
arbitration cases that reached decision.6 2 By contrast, business
plaintiffs litigating contract claims in the seventy-five largest
American counties prevailed 76.8% of the time overall, and
78.9% of the time in bench trial cases.63
Fellows further stated that case duration in arbitration is
shorter than in litigation. Consumer claims against businesses
typically lasted 4.35 months in arbitration and 19.4 months in
litigation. 64 For business-initiated claims, the figures were 5.60
and 15 months, respectively." In addition, for claims consumers
brought against businesses, businesses paid an average
arbitration fee of $149.50; for claims businesses initiated,
consumers paid an average arbitration fee of $46.63." This is
consistent with findings that consumers typically do not pay
large arbitration fees.
Although similarly small, AAA's study of 310 AAA consumer
cases awarded between January and August 2007, offers
further support for the theory that consumers often achieve
consumer's request. 125 of the 129 cases settled or dismissed prior to arbitration are listed as
"consumer prevailed." Id. at 9.
58. Id. at 11.
59. Mark Fellows, The Same Result as in Court, More Efficiently: Comparing
Arbitration and Court Litigation Outcomes, METRO. CORP. COUNS., July 2006, at 32.
California legislation requires arbitration providers to disclose information about
consumer arbitrations. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96(a) (West 2007) (requiring that
private arbitration companies provide quarterly publication of consumer arbitration
information on their websites in a computer searchable format).







67. The AAA's study examined noncollections cases. Analysis of the American
Arbitration Association's Consumer Arbitration Caseload, AM. ARBITRATION AsS'N,
http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=5027 (last visited Sept. 9, 2011).
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positive results in arbitration. In that study, AAA noted that
consumers prevail in 48% of cases in which they are the
claimant." By contrast, businesses prevail in 74% of cases in
which they are the claimant." Following that study, the Searle
Civil Justice Institute examined 301 AAA-administered
consumer arbitrations closed by an award between April and
December 2007.0 The Searle Institute found that consumers in
these arbitrations paid minimal administrative fees. For
example, in cases with claims of less than $10,000, consumer
claimants paid an average fee of $96;71 in cases where the
consumer's claim was between $10,000 and $75,000, the fee
increased to $219.72 Arbitration also proved to be a speedy
dispute resolution process. The Searle Institute found that the
average time from filing to final award was 6.9 months." This
finding is consistent with Cole and Blankley's analysis of the
34,000 NAF-administered cases. In that study, Cole and
Blankley found that a majority of arbitration cases are settled
within 200 days, or in under seven months.7 4 Similarly, cases that
went to hearing were also resolved, on average, in less than
seven months.7 ' By contrast, the average length of time from
filing to trial in the federal district courts of California during
that period was over two years.76
Consumers in the AAA arbitrations also experienced success
in their filings, winning relief in 53.3% of the cases filed and
receiving an average of $19,255." Arbitrators were also quite
willing to award attorney's fees to consumer claimants who
71
sought fees, awarding fees to claimants in 63.1% of the cases.
Finally, the study did not find a statistically significant repeat
player effect-consumers won some relief in 51.8% of cases
against repeat businesses (i.e., businesses who appear more than
once in the AAA dataset)."
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INST., supra note 23, at 37.
71. Only $1 of those fees were administrative; the other $95 were arbitrators' fees.
Id. at 57.
72. Id. (explaining that $204 in arbitrator fees plus $15 in administrative fees make
up $219 total).
73. Id. at 63.
74. Cole & Blankley, supra note 31, at 1071.
75. Id. at 1072.
76. Id. at 1073.
77. SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INST., supra note 23, at 67-69.
78. Id. at 71.
79. Id. at 76.
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In addition, the study considered whether arbitration
procedures were fair to consumers, using the question whether
the parties complied with the Consumer Due Process Protocol to
address this issue." The study found that a substantial majority
of consumer arbitration clauses comply with the due process
protocol at the time the claim is filed, and that AAA refused to
administer the case if the clause did not comply." AAA also
independently conducted a protocol compliance review of
arbitration clauses appearing in filed claims." As a result of this
review, some businesses modified their arbitration clauses to
ensure consistency with the due process protocol.
The Searle Institute identified potential limitations of its
study-e.g., its small dataset and that all of the cases were
administered by AAA-but nevertheless concluded that
consumer arbitration appears speedier and less costly for
consumers than critics have alleged and that the repeat player
83effect appears to be minimal, or non-existent, in most cases.
While the data available is surely incomplete, it nevertheless
suggests that elimination of consumer arbitration at the present
time, as the AFA mandates, would be unwise. If consumers can
save money while achieving results similar to or better than they
would in court, it would seem counterintuitive to bar them from
agreeing to do so. Rather than impeding consumer access to
justice, any new legislation should facilitate access and focus on
improving arbitration as a process for vindicating rights.84 As
Professor Rutledge notes, some AFA advocates argue that the
AFA in its current form is necessary so that consumers may
bring class actions." While the evidence available on that issue,
discussed in the next section, reveals a very different picture
than does the evidence on consumer arbitration generally, an
AFA that bans consumer arbitration entirely is unnecessary to
solve the problem class action waivers create."
80. The Consumer Due Process Protocol sets fairness standards to govern consumer
arbitration. AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, supra note 4. The Protocol, among other things,
ensures an arbitration process that is accessible, reasonable in terms of cost and location,
and overseen by competent, unbiased neutrals. Id. at Principals 2-4, 6-7.
81. SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INST., supra note 23, at 84, 93.
82. Id. at 83-87 ("AAA does not review clauses for protocol compliance in cases
seeking more than $75,000.").
83. Id. at xiii-xiv.
84. Case Against AFA, supra note 20, at 4 ("[Eliminating predispute arbitration
agreements impedes rather than improves an individual's access to justice.").
85. Id. at 7.
86. SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INST., supra note 23, at 26, 63, 68 (stating that consumer
fees ranged from $125 to half of the arbitrator's compensation if the claim was for greater
than $75,000, the median time from filing to award was 168 days, and the average
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B. Business Implementations of Class Action and Class
Arbitration Waivers8 7
Although the available empirical evidence establishes that
consumer arbitration may provide more benefit to consumers
with significant individual claims than would litigation, the
evidence also shows that the primary reason many companies
implement arbitration provisions is to avoid class action
procedures." While it is not surprising that companies would
prefer to avoid class procedures, the effect of these clauses, which
ultimately preclude individuals from vindicating low-value
claims either in the judicial or arbitral fora, is troubling.
Although arbitration can be an efficient, speedy, low-cost dispute
resolution mechanism, the existence of this alternate forum
should not be used to deny parties the ability to have their case
heard in some venue. While numerous policy groups and
academics have expressed concern regarding this issue, until
the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Concepcion and
Stolt-Nielsen, the impetus for radical change was not present.8 9
consumer claimant was awarded 52.1% of what they claimed); Cole & Blankley, supra
note 31, at 1067-70 (explaining that NAF data indicates that most consumers paid few or
no fees, spent roughly the same or less time as they would have in court, and did not have
to pay the full amount claimed by the business); RUTLEDGE, supra note 44, at 22-24
(arguing that arbitration is often less expensive, and even when it is not, existing
mechanisms adequately regulate the burden borne by the individual).
87. Critics attack lack of arbitrator disclosure, limited discovery, limited judicial
review, and other factors as problematic. See Federal Arbitration Act: Is the Credit Card
Industry Using It to Quash Legal Claims?: Before the Subcomm. on Commercial & Admin.
Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 99-100 (2009) (testimony of Richard
H. Frankel, Esquire, Earl Mack School of Law, Drexel University) (stating that because
arbitration is private and the arbitrators do not provide written opinions, the decisions
fail to create binding precedent and allow the arbitrators to make "wacky or silly" rulings
that will not be overturned); Demaine & Hensler, supra note 2, at 68, 72-73 (examining
the limitations on discovery in consumer agreements and concluding that businesses have
an advantage in arbitration discovery). Yet problems other than the class processes bans
are less significant-in part because the empirical research establishes that, for most
consumers, arbitration provides a fair process for adjudication of their claims. SEARLE
CIVIL JUSTICE INST., supra note 23, at 6-16 (explaining that consumer arbitration is, for
the most part, as fair, if not fairer, than litigation). Moreover, creation of documents like
the Consumer Due Process Protocol, which major arbitral providers adopted, ameliorates
the impact of some of these other issues. AM. ARBITRATION AsS'N, supra note 4; JAMS,
POLICY ON EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION MINIMUM STANDARDS 5 (2009). Finally, companies
appear to be modifying their arbitration agreements (and arbitral providers modifying their
cost structures) to address procedural problems. SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INST., supra note 23,
at xiv. ("In response to AAA review, more than 150 businesses have either waived
problematic provisions on an ongoing basis or revised arbitration clauses to remove
provisions that violated the Consumer Due Process Protocol.").
88. Eisenberg, Miller & Sherwin, supra note 2, at 887-88.
89. See More on Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds, ADR PROF BLOG (Apr. 29,
2010) http/vww.indisputably.orgf?p=1284 (citing to Paul Kirgis's letter) (arguing that
Stolt-Nielsen's holding allows companies to "check a box to exempt themselves from
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With the likely elimination of class action arbitration as an
alternative to arbitration for a party with a low-value claim,
numerous individuals will be unable to vindicate their claims in
any venue.
Empirical studies of consumer arbitration agreements
establish that businesses, particularly credit card and cell
phone companies, implement arbitration agreements in order
to avoid either class action or class arbitration processes.o
Other industries also utilize predispute arbitration
agreements in their contracts with consumers, but to varying
lesser degrees." Whatever the underlying motivation, the
evidence shows that many industries systematically avoid
class procedures through the implementation of consumer
arbitration agreements.
In 2008, Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey Miller, and Emily
Sherwin published a study whose data suggests that businesses
use arbitration agreements in consumer contracts frequently and
for the primary purpose of avoiding class processes rather than,
as is often claimed, for the purpose of promoting fair and efficient
dispute resolution." The authors reviewed almost 200 consumer
and nonconsumer contracts from 21 corporations in a variety of
businesses (including wireless, banking, and cable services).9 3
Seventy-five percent of the consumer contracts contained an
arbitration clause." Each and every one of these arbitration
clauses included a class arbitration waiver." Based on this data,
class actions"); Bill Mears, Court Rules for Company in Dispute Over Taxes on 'Free'
Cell Phone, CNN.coM (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/JS/04127/
scotus.class.action.arbitrationlindex.html?iref=allsearch (reporting that consumer groups
were disappointed in the Concepcion ruling because they did not think the Federal
Arbitration Act was "hostile to class actions").
90. Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate
Consumer Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 75 (2004); Eisenberg, Miller & Sherwin, supra note 2, at 882-84
(reporting that the overwhelming majority of businesses in their study included
mandatory arbitration agreements and that most of those agreements contained class
action waivers); Kaplinsky, supra note 22, at 505 ("Alll major credit card issuers [are using
arbitration], e.g., Citibank, Chase, AMEX, Discover Card, Capital One, GE Capital. Bank of
America recently announced that it will no longer seek to arbitrate consumer disputes.
However, it will continue to use and seek to enforce class action waivers.").
91. See Demaine & Hensler, supra note 2, at 63-64 (reporting that arbitration
clauses are used by approximately one third or fewer of the companies in the housing and
home services, retail services, health care, food and entertainment, and travel industries).
92. Eisenberg, Miller & Sherwin, supra note 2, at 886-88.
93. Id. at 881-82.
94. Id. at 882-83.
95. Id. at 884. Professor Eisenberg noted that 60% of the consumer contracts that
contained arbitration clauses also contained provisions that these clauses would be void if
the arbitration process permitted class wide activity. Id. at 884-85. Eisenberg also noted
20111 ON BABIES AND BATHWATER: THE AFA
Professor Eisenberg and his co-authors concluded that businesses
use consumer arbitration clauses as a means to avoid "aggregate
dispute resolution."96 The "strategic advantage" businesses obtain
through use of these clauses is the avoidance or the decreased
threat of class actions.
A subsequent study of Eisenberg's data clarified rather
than debunked Eisenberg's conclusions. According to
Professors Chris Drahozal and Stephen Ware, Eisenberg's
conclusions should be limited to use of arbitration clauses in
credit card and cell phone contracts and cannot necessarily be
expanded to other businesses' use of arbitration clauses."
Reviewing data from the Searle Civil Justice Institute's
Consumer Arbitration Task Force Report, Drahozal and Ware
found that while use of class arbitration waivers was common
in cell phone company and credit card contracts, waivers were
less frequently used by automobile dealers, casualty insurers,
home builders, and real estate brokers." According to the
Searle data, auto dealers use class action waivers about 50% of
the time and home builders use them about 65% of the time;
but casualty insurers and real estate brokers never use them
and mobile home dealers rarely use them.9 0 The authors also
noted that even with credit card and consumer finance
companies, the businesses may use arbitration not only to
avoid class actions but also in order to collect bad debts. 0'
The most recent empirical research on this issue offers
additional support for Eisenberg et al.'s findings that companies
that waivers of class wide arbitration, provisions voiding the arbitration agreement if
class wide activity is ordered, and waivers of class action litigation are more frequent in
consumer than in business-to-business and employment contracts. Id. at 884.
96. Id. at 888.
97. Id. at 895-96. The authors viewed the use of arbitration clauses as "strategic"
because they found that businesses use arbitration clauses against consumers but less
frequently against each other. Id. The use of arbitration in consumer contracts, rather
than in contracts involving other businesses, suggests that businesses' claims that they
use arbitration with consumers to promote efficiency and fairness, are pretextual. If
fairness and efficiency were the goals, why not use arbitration in business-to-business
contracts as well? In their subsequent study, Professors Drahozal and Ware cast doubt on this
conclusion. See Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or Not
Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHo ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 433, 457-67, 470-72 (2010)
(explaining that Eisenberg's study is limited to a fairly narrow range of industries and that the
use of arbitration by these types of businesses against other businesses is not truly "rare").
98. Drahozal & Ware, supra note 97, at 468.
99. Id. at 472-73.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 474, n.174. Drahozal and Ware questioned Eisenberg et al.'s conclusion
that cell phone and credit card issuers use arbitration agreements only to avoid class
relief. In their view, these companies use arbitration agreements as a means for collecting
bad debts as well as to avoid class processes. Id.
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utilize arbitration agreements with consumers in order to avoid
class processes. Examining arbitration terms from thirteen
wireless phone service and credit card contracts, Professor Amy
Schmitz found that three did not include predispute arbitration
agreements, one had an opt-out provision, and two had terms
that were unavailable. 02 The remaining seven contracts
containing arbitration clauses varied in some respects."o
Importantly for this Article, however, Professor Schmitz found
that "all of the contracts' arbitration provisions expressly
precluded class action or consolidated proceedings of any kind, in
court or in arbitration."' Professor Schmitz emphasized that her
examination of nine wireless service companies' arbitration
clauses confirmed Eisenberg's earlier conclusion that companies
utilized arbitration clauses in consumer contracts in order to
prevent class actions of any kind.o' After reviewing these clauses,
Professor Schmitz concluded that "companies use arbitration
clauses to limit their vulnerability to consumer claims, especially
class actions .",o
Taken together, Eisenberg et al.'s comprehensive study,
followed by Schmitz's survey, suggest strongly that financial
services and telecommunications companies implement consumer
arbitration agreements primarily to avoid class processes. The
Searle data also offers general support for these conclusions, but
suggests that other industries use arbitration agreements and
class waivers less frequently or not at all. Professors Drahozal
and Ware do not explain why these other businesses do not use
class action waivers as frequently as do the telecommunications
and financial services industry. While other explanations may
ultimately prevail, it may be either that the uncertainty over the
enforceability of such waivers,o' or AAA's policy to refuse
102. Schmitz, supra note 29, at 145-46.
103. Id. at 146.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 147-48. Professor Schmitz reviewed nine contracts and found that all of
them included waivers of class proceedings in either court or arbitration. Id. at 148.
106. Id. at 150.
107. Some federal circuits have held that class action waivers are valid. These
include the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits. See Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc.,
303 F.3d 496, 506-07 (4th Cir. 2002); Snowden v. CheckPoint Check Cashing, 290 F.3d
631, 638-39 (4th Cir. 2002); In re Cotton Yarn Antitrust Litig., 505 F.3d 274, 293 (4th Cir.
2007); Carter v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 362 F.3d 294, 301-02 (5th Cir. 2004);
Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 174-76 (5th Cir.
2004); Livingston v. Assocs. Fin., Inc., 339 F.3d 553, 558-59 (7th Cir. 2003); Iowa Grain
v. Brown, 171 F.3d 504, 509-11 (7th Cir. 1999); Cicle v. Chase Bank USA, 583 F.3d
549, 554-57 (8th Cir. 2009); Pleasants v. Am. Express Co., 541 F.3d 853, 859 (8th
Cir. 2008); Dominium Austin Partners, LLC v. Emerson, 248 F.3d 720, 728-29 (8th
Cir. 2001).
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administration of cases that include class arbitration waivers,
discourages these businesses from wholesale adoption of class
process waivers.
If the uncertainty of class process waiver enforceability or
AAA and others' policies not to administer cases containing class
arbitration waivers initially discouraged some businesses from
adopting class process waivers in arbitration agreements, the
Court's decisions in Concepcion and Stolt-Nielsen go far in
alleviating concern about risking use of a waiver and may, for all
practical purposes, eliminate class arbitrations. As a result, it is
likely that businesses will increase their use of consumer
arbitration agreements, even in those industries that were
initially slow to adopt them. To understand fully why this is the
case, this Article now turns to these decisions.
III. RECENT SUPREME COURT ARBITRATION JURISPRUDENCE
In the 2010 term, the Supreme Court held that an
arbitration agreement is enforceable even when the effect of the
arbitration agreement is to preclude class arbitration processes.a
Following an earlier Supreme Court decision in Green Tree
Financial Corp. v. Bazzle (Bazzle), in which a plurality of the
Justices held that the parties could delegate to the arbitrator the
power to decide whether or not a class action arbitration is
permissible,o' the Court in Concepcion and Stolt-Nielsen virtually
The Third Circuit previously tended to allow class action waivers. See Gay v.
CreditInform, 511 F.3d 369, 395 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting that access to class actions is not a
right but rather is a procedural option and so it can be waived); Cronin v. Citifinancial
Servs., Inc., 352 F. App'x. 630, 636-37 (3d Cir. 2009). However, the Third Circuit recently
ruled that class action waivers violate the public policy of New Jersey. Homa v. Am.
Express Co., 558 F.3d 225, 230 (3d Cir. 2009).
The Eleventh Circuit allows class action waivers as long as a fee-shifting feature exists.
See Jenkins v. First Am. Cash Advance of Ga., LLC, 400 F.3d 868, 878 (11th Cir. 2005), cert.
denied, 546 U.S. 1214 (2006); Dale v. Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216, 1224 (11th Cir. 2007).
The First, Second, and Ninth Circuits have found class action waivers
unconscionable or unenforceable. See Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 60-64 (1st
Cir. 2006); Skirchak v. Dynamics Research Corp., 508 F.3d 49, 59 (1st Cir. 2007); In re
Am. Express Merchants' Litig., 634 F.3d 187, 197-99 (2d Cir. 2009); Ting v. AT&T, 319
F.3d 1126, 1150 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 811 (2003); Ingle v. Circuit City
Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1176 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1160 (2004);
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Mantor, 335 F.3d 1101, 1107 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540
U.S. 1160 (2004); Al-Safin v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 394 F.3d 1254, 1262 (9th Cir. 2005);
Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). The
Sixth and Tenth Circuits have yet to rule on the issue.
108. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775-76 (2010).
109. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 451-53 (2003) (plurality opinion)
(remanding the case so that the arbitrator could decide whether the contract allowed class
arbitration). Below, in Bazzle v. Green Tree Financial Corp., the South Carolina Supreme
Court affirmed the arbitrator's decision to order class action arbitration. After
482 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [48:3
closed the door on the possibility that courts will offer assistance
to parties seeking some way to aggregate their claims in class
arbitration, unless the parties clearly and unmistakably express
their intent to permit such aggregation.
Before Stolt-Nielsen was decided, arbitrators could, and
often did, order class action arbitration when the parties'
arbitration agreement was silent regarding whether such action
was permitted."o Although businesses likely wished to avoid this
result, they were reluctant to explicitly prohibit class actions or
class action arbitration because some courts held that class
action waivers, particularly in the consumer context, were
unconscionable and unenforceable."' As a result, many
companies maintained arbitration agreements silent on the issue
of class actions, hoping that the arbitrator assigned their case
would not order class action arbitration.112
acknowledging that the state's laws permitted consolidation of arbitrations without the
parties' express consent, that court explained that "[ilf we enforced a mandatory, adhesive
arbitration clause, but prohibited class actions in arbitration where the agreement is
silent, the drafting party could effectively prevent class actions against it without having
to say it was doing so." Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 569 S.E.2d 349, 360 (S.C. 2002).
110. See Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 449, 451-54 (plurality opinion); Dealer Computer Servs.,
Inc. v. Dub Herring Ford, 623 F.3d 348, 350 (6th Cir. 2006) (arbitration panel permitted
defendants to arbitrate as a class); Jock v. Sterling Jewelers, 725 F. Supp. 2d 444, 445
(S.D.N.Y. 2010), rev'd, 646 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2011) (explaining an arbitrator's June 1,
2009, decision to order class arbitration when the arbitration agreement failed to
expressly prohibit class claims); Sutter v. Oxford Health Plans LLC, 227 Fed. Appx.
135, 137-38 (3d Cir. 2007) (affirming the arbitrator's issuance of a final class
determination award based on an arbitration agreement requiring adherence to the
American Arbitration Association's Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitration);
Cable Connection, Inc. v. DirectTV, Inc., 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 187, 201 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th
2006), rev'd, 82 Cal. Rptr. 3d 229 (upholding the arbitrator's decision to allow class
arbitration when there was no express provision in the agreement prohibiting
classwide arbitration). For example, the arbitrators in Bazzle ordered class action
arbitration when the arbitration agreement was silent on the issue of class action
arbitration.
111. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
112. Another reason that companies might have chosen to leave arbitration
agreements silent on the issue of class actions is that both AAA and JAMS, the major
arbitrator providers, approved of class processes or were silent on the issue. AAA Policy
on Class Arbitrations, AM. ARBITRATION Ass'N (July 14, 2005), http://www.adr.org/
sp.asp?id=28779 (stating that because of the decision in Bazzle, AAA "is not currently
accepting for administration demands for class arbitration where the underlying
agreement prohibits class claims" unless a court orders AAA to administer arbitration on
a class basis); JAMS Class Action Procedures, JAMS, http://wwwjamsadr.coml
rules-class-action-procedures/ (last visited July 20, 2011). AAA based its policy on its
interpretation of Bazzle. AAA's class arbitration policy stated:
In Bazzle, the Court held that, where an arbitration agreement was silent
regarding the availability of class-wide relief, an arbitrator, and not a court,
must decide whether class relief is permitted. Accordingly, the American
Arbitration Association will administer demands for class arbitration pursuant
to its Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations if (1) the underlying
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In Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., the
Court, in a 5-3 decision written by Justice Alito,"' reduced
businesses' uncertainty by casting doubt on the continuing
viability of class action arbitration as an alternative dispute
resolution mechanism, at least in agreements where the issue of
class action arbitration is not explicitly addressed.H4
The case involved two sophisticated business parties with
relatively equal bargaining power who negotiated an arbitration
agreement that did not address the question whether class action
arbitration was permissible."' At arbitration, the parties stated
agreement specifies that disputes arising out of the parties' agreement shall be
resolved by arbitration in accordance with any of the Association's rules, and (2)
the agreement is silent with respect to class claims, consolidation or joinder of
claims.
AAA Policy on Class Arbitrations, AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, (July 14, 2005),
http//www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=28779. Moreover, AAA stated that it would not currently
handle arbitrations if the parties' arbitration agreement precluded class processes.
Id. JAMS, the other major provider, adopted a similar rule. JAMS, CLASS ACTION
PROCEDURES 23 (2009), available at http//www.jamsadr.com/files/UploadsfDocuments/
JAMS-Rules/JAMSClass Action Procedures-2009.pdf. Rule la of JAMS's class arbitration
policy states that "JAMS will not administer a demand for class action arbitration when the
underlying agreement contains a class preclusion clause, or its equivalent, unless a court
orders the matter or claim to arbitration as a class action." Id.; see also Alan S.
Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, Is JAMS in a Jam Over Its Policy Regarding Class Action
Waivers in Consumer Arbitration Agreements?, 61 BUS. LAW. 923, 925 (2006) (stating that on
November 12, 2004, JAMS issued a policy whereby it would no longer enforce class action
waiver clauses in arbitration and that JAMS would accept class action arbitration cases, even
if there is a class action preclusion clause, and not enforce the waiver); Press Release, JAMS,
JAMS Reaffirms Commitment to Neutrality Through Withdrawal of Class Action Arbitration
Waiver Policy (Mar. 10, 2005) httpf//web.archive.org/webt20071012032743/httpJ/
www.jamsadr.com/press/show release-print.aspid=198 (stating that JAMS revoked its policy
announced in November of 2004 in light of recent court rulings on the validity of class action
waivers and that JAMS would henceforth "apply the law on a case by case basis in each
jurisdiction").
113. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). Justice
Alito authored the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas. Id. at 1763. Justice Sotomayor did not take part in the
consideration or decision of the case. Id.
114. Id. at 1775-76. The Court also held that the arbitrators' decision to order class
action arbitration, based on their view that public policy favors class action arbitration,
exceeded the scope of their powers under Federal Arbitration Act § 10(a)(4) and therefore
can be disregarded. Id. at 1767-68. While this Article does not address the issue of scope
of judicial review, I will note that this holding is remarkable because it suggests that
courts may return to a more substantive review of arbitrator decisionmaking and that the
doctrine of "manifest disregard" may still be viable despite the Court's earlier holding in
Hall Street v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584-85 (2008).
115. Stolt-Nielsen is a shipping company that charters portions of its vessels for
customers who want to ship liquids in small quantities. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1764.
AnimalFeeds, which supplies raw ingredients to animal-feed producers around the world,
contracted, using a standard maritime contract known as a "charter party," with Stolt-Nielsen
to transport animal feed. Id. Charterers, like AnimalFeeds, select the particular charter
party that they wish to use. Id. at 1764-65. In this case, the charter party AnimalFeeds
selected contained an arbitration clause drafted in 1950. Id. The clause stated that any
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that they never agreed to participate in a class arbitration. 116
Nevertheless, the arbitral panel ruled that class arbitration could
proceed for two reasons. First, the panel held that the clause
should be read to permit class action arbitration following the
Court's decision in Bazzle."' Second, the panel concluded that it
could order class arbitration because public policy favors class
arbitration even if the arbitration agreement does not address
class arbitration.'18
The Supreme Court ruled that the arbitrators should not
have relied on AnimalFeeds's argument that public policy
permits an arbitrator to construe an arbitration clause to allow
class arbitration."' Instead of relying on their view of public
policy, the arbitrators should have identified a rule of law (for
example, the FAA, federal maritime law, or New York law) that
governs the issue of class arbitration.'20 Their failure to do so,
combined with their choice to act as a common law court to
develop what they viewed as the best rule for the situation,
exceeded the scope of the panel's powers under the agreement
and, therefore, had to be reversed. 2 '
Justice Ginsburg, in dissent, expressed concern that the
holding, which prohibits arbitrators from ordering class arbitration
unless the parties' agreement allows them to do so, remained
limited to agreements among repeat players. Justice Ginsburg
stated, "by observing that 'the parties [here] are sophisticated
business entities,' and 'that it is customary for the shipper to choose
the charter party that is used for a particular shipment,' the Court
disputes arising out of the contract will be settled in New York through tri-partite
arbitration. Id. at 1765. The Department of Justice initiated a criminal investigation of
Stolt-Nielsen in 2003, concluding that they were engaging in illegal price-fixing. Id.
AnimalFeeds brought a class action against Stolt-Nielsen in federal court, as did other
charterers. Id. Ultimately, AnimalFeeds was ordered to arbitration and filed a class
action arbitration complaint against Stolt-Nielsen. Id. The parties entered into a
supplemental agreement enabling the arbitrators to decide whether class action
arbitration was permitted. Id.
116. Id. at 1775.
117. Id. at 1766, 1769. The Court stated that Bazzle did not create a rule to be
applied in deciding whether class arbitration is permitted. Id. at 1772. Rather (and the
Court reminded readers that Bazzle was a plurality decision), the Court in Bazzle stated
that arbitrators, rather than courts, interpret whether the parties agreed to class action
arbitration. Id. at 1771-72. Thus, Bazzle did not bind the Court in this case, and the
Court stated that "[an implicit agreement to authorize class action arbitration, however,
is not a term that the arbitrator may infer solely from the fact of the parties' agreement to
arbitrate." Id. at 1771-72, 1775.
118. Id. at 1768-69.
119. Id. at 1768-70.
120. Id.
121. See id. at 1770, 1774 (holding that the arbitrators exceeded their power and that
an arbitrator's authority is derived from the agreement of the parties).
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apparently spares from its affirmative-authorization requirement
contracts of adhesion presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis."122
While Justice Ginsburg suggests that the majority's holding
about silent arbitration clauses is limited to cases involving
sophisticated repeat players, it is not clear that lower courts will
limit Stolt-Nielsen to its facts.' A probable consequence of the
decision is that every business with an arbitration clause will
maintain silence on the issue of class action arbitration or, if its
clause permits class action arbitration, will amend it so that it is
silent on the issue.'24 Although the Court did not decide "what
contractual basis may support a finding that the parties agreed
to authorize class-action arbitration," a logical interpretation of
the opinion suggests that courts will not allow arbitrators to
interpret silent clauses to permit class action arbitration.'2 5
The Court's decision appears to prohibit future arbitrators
from interpreting an arbitration agreement that is silent on the
issue of class action arbitrations to allow for such arbitrations
unless the parties, post-agreement, explicitly consent to the class
action arbitration process.126 In addition, the Court's suggestion
122. Id. at 1783 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
123. Id. Paul Kirgis reached the same conclusion. In a blog post at
http//www.indisputably.org, Professor Kirgis stated, "Justice Ginsburg, in dissent, makes the
point that this decision does not necessarily foreclose class arbitrations in consumer cases. But
[its] logic does not stop at complex commercial disputes." Paul Kirgis, More on Stolt-Nielsen v.
AnimalFeeds, ADR PROF BLoG (Apr. 29, 2010), http://www.indisputably.org/
?p=1284. Philip J. Loree, a commercial litigator who has written extensively on this case,
agreed as well. According to Loree, Stolt-Nielsen "put the kibosh on class arbitration in
the commercial context and most probably also in the context of adhesive contracts."
Loree, supra note 5, at 121 (2010).
But H. Scott Leviant disagrees, at least in California: "so much for Stolt-Nielsen
destroying class actions." H. Scott Leviant, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. et al. v. AnimalFeeds
International Corp.: Less Than Meets the Eye, THE COMPLEx LIGATOR (May 3, 2010),
http//www.thecomplexlitigator.com/post-data/2010/5/3/stolt-nielsen-s-a-et-al-v-animalfeeds-
international-corp-les.html. He believes that the motives behind California's default rules
favoring class arbitration apply most strongly in consumer disputes. See id. (likening
California's reason for finding a default rule against agreements barring class actions to
Justice Ginsburg's claim that courts have invalidated such agreements because they
prevent claimants from proceeding due to the high cost of litigation, and noting that in
consumer wage and hour employment arbitrations, there is often a disparity in
sophistication between the parties).
124. See Kirgis, supra note 123 ("So it is difficult to read the decision as anything but
an attempt to single out and eliminate class arbitration, except in cases where the parties
explicitly provide for class arbitration (which will be never).").
125. Stolt-Nielsen S.A, 130 S. Ct. at 1776 n.10.
126. Id. at 1775. Professor Jean Sternlight, among others, predicted that the
decision will mean the end of class arbitration. Jean Sternlight, Sternlight on Stolt-Nielsen
v. AnimalFeeds, ADR PROF BLOG (Apr. 29, 2010), http://www.indisputably.org/
?p=1287. Moreover, Sternlight suggested, companies will rely on Stolt-Nielsen to
argue that the FAA preempts a claim that prohibition of class actions is
unconscionable. Id.
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that an arbitrator could look to some rule of law to support
ordering class arbitration seems like a straw man. Nothing in the
FAA addresses class arbitration, and the Court itself indicated
that class arbitration is so different from traditional arbitration
that it is hard to imagine a court finding that the FAA is a source
of authority for ordering class arbitration.'2 7 What other rules of
law would be available to justify ordering class action arbitration
is also unclear. Because businesses prefer to avoid class actions,
they will likely ignore the issue of class arbitration in their
arbitration agreements to avoid the possibility that arbitrators
will find that they agreed to class action arbitration.
Following Stolt-Nielsen, one might have believed that a
consumer could still argue that an arbitration agreement that is
silent on the issue of class arbitration is unconscionable if it is
interpreted to preclude class actions or class arbitration. That
question may be unlikely to arise, however, in light of the Court's
more recent decision in AT&T v. Concepcion.12 8 Concepcion
raised the question of whether the FAA prevents states from
conditioning the enforceability of certain consumer arbitration
agreements on the availability of class arbitration
procedures."
The Concepcions were part of a consumer class action
brought in California, contending that AT&T engaged in fraud
when it offered a "free" phone to all customers who signed up for
their service but then charged each consumer substantial sales
Alvin L. Goldman suspects that "a party may not be compelled under the FAA to
submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the
party agreed to do so." Alvin L. Goldman, Goldman's Take on AnimalFeeds, ADR PROF
BLOG (May 3, 2010), http://www.indisputably.org/9p=1295.
Barry Barnett points out that the recent Second Circuit decision, Fenterstock v.
Education Finance Partners, 611 F.2d 124, 141 (2d Cir. 2010), confirms his earlier
suspicion that arbitrators "will have no choice but to deny almost all class certification
requests." Barry Barnett, Stolt-Nielsen Kills Class Arbitration But Not Class Action, Second
Circuit Holds, BLAWGLE'TER (July 12, 2010, 3:55 PM), http:/blawgletter.typepad.com/
bbarnett/2010/07/stoltnielsen-kills-class-arbitration-but-not-class-action-second-circuit-holds.
html?utm source=feedburner&utm medium=feed&utm campaign=Feed%3A+Blawgletter
+%28Blawgletter%C2%AE%29.
127. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1775-76.
128. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
129. Id. at 1744. The question whether a class action or class arbitration waiver in a
consumer arbitration agreement is enforceable is "[olne of the most important arbitration
questions that has yet to be definitively resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court." Alan S.
Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, Consensus or Conflict? Most (But Not All) Courts Enforce
Express Class Action Waivers in Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 60 BUS. LAW. 775, 775
(2005); F. Paul Bland, Jr. & Claire Prestel, Challenging Class Action Bans in Mandatory
Arbitration Clauses, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 369, 370 (2009) (enforceability of
class waivers is "one of the most hotly contested issues in consumer and employee
litigation").
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tax ($30.22 for phones delivered to the named plaintiff).' After
the plaintiff filed its claim in federal court, AT&T moved for
arbitration."' The court, relying on California unconscionability
law, held that the contract's prohibition on class actions was
unenforceable.'3 2 Unlike arbitration provisions at issue in other
cases, though, AT&T's provision provided the plaintiffs the
ability to obtain full relief for their claims. The arbitration
agreement applied AAA procedural rules, gave the consumer the
option to bring his claim in small claims court in lieu of
arbitration, permitted the arbitrator to award the full remedies
that would have been available to the consumer in court, and
offered the consumer a $7,500 minimum recovery if the arbitral
award exceeded AT&T's last settlement offer.
The primary issue in this case was whether California's
treatment of unconscionability in the context of arbitration
agreements differs from its treatment of unconscionability in
traditional contracts.34 If the treatment differed, as AT&T
contended, the FAA would preempt California's rule.'3 ' The
question of whether a class waiver is unconscionable first arose
in an earlier California case, Discover Bank v. Superior Court
(Boehr).3 6 In Discover Bank, a California court ruled that class
action arbitration must be made available to consumers with
arbitration agreements in order for those agreements to be
130. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744.
131. Id. at 1744-45.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1744; see also Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 856 n.10 (9th
Cir. 2009) (detailing the AT&T consumer policies), rev'd sub nom. AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct 1740 (2011).
134. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746.
135. Id. at 1747. In its brief, AT&T contends that for traditional contracts, California
requires proof that the contract's terms shock the conscience. Brief for Petitioner at 18, AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (No. 09-893). By contrast, for arbitration
agreements, AT&T states that California applies the Discover Bank test, which is a different
kind of test. Brief for Petitioner, supra, at 32-33. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument,
stating that the Discover Bank test "is simply a refinement of the unconscionability analysis
applicable to contracts generally in California." Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs.,
Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 987 (9th Cir. 2007). AT&T further contends that California treats
arbitration agreements differently than other contracts because they looked at the impact of
the class waiver in the Concepcions' agreement on nonparties to the agreement in order to
justify the unconscionability finding. See Brief for Petitioner, supra, at 32, 34-36 (arguing
that California's treatment of unconscionability claims in arbitration agreements differs from
their treatment of unconscionability claims when applied to contracts generally, including as
an example the fact that the lower court based their finding of unconscionability in
Concepcion on persons other than parties to the litigation, a "standard that finds no support
in California's generally applicable unconscionability principles"). This approach stands in
sharp contrast to traditional unconscionability analysis, which would only allow a court to
examine the situation in front of the court, not the impact of the contract on third parties. Id.
136. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005).
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enforceable.' According to petitioner AT&T, California adopted
a three-part test in the Discover Bank case to evaluate the
enforceability of an arbitration agreement.' Under the test, a
court will declare an agreement unconscionable if it is found in a
consumer contract of adhesion, "in a setting in which disputes
between the contracting parties predictably involve small
amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the party with
the superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to
deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually
small sums of money."'"' This test, AT&T claimed, is significantly
different than the test used to evaluate whether
unconscionability is present in contracts that do not contain
arbitration agreements. 40 The Ninth Circuit rejected this
argument, holding that the FAA does not preempt the Discover
Bank rule because class proceedings do not reduce the efficiency
of arbitration, and that the rule is "simply a refinement of the
unconscionability analysis applicable to contracts generally in
California." 4'
The Supreme Court held that California's rule applied the
unconscionability analysis differently in arbitration agreements
than when analyzing other contracts and was, therefore,
preempted.'42 The Concepcions argued to the Court that the
137. Id.; see also Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 866-88 (2002)
(finding an arbitration clause that prohibited class treatment of small individual claims
both procedurally and substantively unconscionable).
138. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 135, at 4.
139. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1110.
140. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 135, at 18.
141. Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 856 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 987 (9th Cir. 2007)), rev'd
sub nom. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). The Third Circuit,
addressing the same question, ruled that the FAA preempts Pennsylvania's rule that
provisions waiving the right to bring a class action are unconscionable. See Gay v.
CreditInform, 511 F.3d 369, 387-95 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting that, while Virginia law applies
under the arbitration agreement's choice of law provisions, the arbitration agreement
would still be enforceable under Pennsylvania law because the FAA preempts certain
Pennsylvania court decisions finding class action waivers unconstitutional). The court
stated:
[W]hatever the benefits of class actions, the FAA "requires piecemeal resolution
when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement," .. . . To the extent,
then, that [Pennsylvania cases] hold that the inclusion of a waiver of the right to
bring judicial class actions in an arbitration agreement constitutes an
unconscionable contract [FAA Section 2 preempts them].
Id. at 394 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Cont. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 20
(1983)).
142. See AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745-48 (2011) (noting that
a court may not find an agreement to arbitrate unconscionable based on the uniqueness of
arbitration, and describing examples of cases in which the Discover Bank rule could be
used to find agreements unconscionable based on the uniqueness of arbitration). Stephen
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application of the class waiver rule to both litigation and
arbitration immunized the rule from preemption. 143 Citing an
example of a court decision that would require judicially
monitored discovery in a consumer arbitration agreement in
order to avoid an unconscionability finding, the Supreme Court,
however, emphasized that applicability to all contracts does not
avoid preemption if "the rule would have a disproportionate
impact on arbitration agreements" even though it would apply to
discovery in litigation as well.4 4 Moreover, the Court stated,
judicial decisions that interfere "with [the] fundamental
attributes of arbitration," are inconsistent with the purposes of
the FAA and would also be preempted.1' The Court cited a
requirement that class wide arbitration be available as an
example of this type of problematic ruling.146 The Court went on
to detail the myriad ways in which class wide arbitration differed
from traditional bilateral arbitration-that the process was
slower, more expensive, more procedurally formal, and more
likely to create risks to defendants-to bolster its conclusion that
its implementation would be an obstacle to achieving Congress's
goals in enacting the FAA.147
While scholars will undoubtedly question the preemption
analysis the majority used in this case,48 the Court's holding
A. Broome, An Unconscionable Application of the Unconscionability Doctrine: How the
California Judiciary is Circumventing the Federal Arbitration Act, 3 HASTINGS Bus. L.J.
39, 44-48, 65-66 (2006) (asserting that California applies a unique brand of
unconscionability to arbitration agreements in direct contravention of the FAA, and
establishing through empirical analysis that application of the unconscionability doctrine
in California results in invalidating arbitration agreements 47% of the time but
invalidating other contracts only 11% of the time).
143. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746-47.
144. Id. at 1747. The Court offered another example to prove its point. The Court
stated that a rule which made it unconscionable to fail to abide by the Federal Rules of
Evidence would have a similarly disproportionate impact on arbitration and therefore be
preempted. Id.
145. Id. at 1748.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1750-52.
148. The Court's rejection of the argument that California's unconscionability
analysis should not be preempted because it applied in both litigation and arbitration
was surprising. The Court ultimately asserted that the change in unconscionability
analysis had greater impact on arbitration than on litigation and interfered with the
goals of the FAA and, on those two grounds, was preempted. Id. at 1747-48, 1750,
1753. On the latter point, the Court went on to emphasize that the fundamental
incompatibility between class arbitration and the goals of the FAA indicate that a
rule conditioning enforceability of an arbitration agreement on the availability of
class arbitration should be preempted. Id. at 1748, 1753. Importantly, too, this case
originated in federal court rather than state court. Id. at 1744. If Justice Thomas
continued his practice of refusing to apply the FAA preemption doctrine in state
court, the outcome in a case similar to Concepcion coming from state court might be
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clearly precludes lower courts from requiring parties subject to
an arbitration agreement to participate in a class action
arbitration to avoid a finding of unconscionability.'" Thus, a
consumer with a low value claim who is unable to convince a
court that his arbitration agreement is not one-sided enough to
be declared unconscionable for reasons other than that it waives
class action participation, but who also cannot afford or did not
find it cost-efficient to bring his case in arbitration, would
effectively be precluded from bringing a claim at all. The
Supreme Court did not explicitly narrow its decision to preclude
states from ordering class arbitration if consumers can effectively
vindicate their claims in individual arbitration, although it did
discuss the ability of the Concepcions to effectively pursue their
claim in bilateral arbitration.'
Considered together, Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion make
clear that it will be the rare case indeed where consumers will be
able to obtain class procedures if they are bound to an arbitration
different. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 460 (2003) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
149. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748. Whether the Court would find provisions other
than class action arbitration waivers unenforceable is an interesting question. The
Court's objection to class arbitration seemed to be based on it being fundamentally
different than, and at odds with, traditional bilateral arbitration. Id. at 1750-52. To the
extent that subsequent state court rulings turn arbitration into something different, one
would expect Concepcion to apply.
150. Id. at 1753. The Supreme Court did not take the best case for resolving the issue
of preemption and unconscionability. As is pointed out repeatedly by AT&T, the
arbitration agreement in the AT&T contract with the Concepcions is unusually generous
with respect to its terms. The Concepcions' agreement with AT&T applies AAA's
procedural rules, permits the plaintiffs to bring their claims in small claims court in lieu
of arbitration, and permits the arbitrator to award any remedies that the plaintiffs could
have obtained in court. See id. at 1744 (noting that the agreement permitted both parties
to bring claims in small claims court in lieu of arbitration and permitted the arbitrators to
award any remedy that a plaintiff could have been awarded by a court); Laster v. AT&T
Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 856 n.10 (9th Cir. 2009), rev'd sub nom. AT&T Mobility LLC
v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1470, 1744 (2011) (noting that the agreement applied AAA's
procedural rules). In addition, plaintiffs would be entitled to a minimum $7,500 recovery
if the arbitral award exceeded AT&T's last settlement offer. Id. While consumer
arbitration agreements have, over time, offered fairer arbitral process to consumers, most
agreements are not this generous to consumers. See Mandatory Binding Arbitration
Agreements: Are they Fair for Consumers?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial
& Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Rep.
Chris Cannon) (arguing that arbitration agreements are becoming increasingly common
and that they are fair to consumers). Most arbitration agreements do not offer the small
claims court alternative or the minimum recovery guarantee. See Jean Sternlight, Cert.
Granted in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, ADR PROF BLOG (May 25, 2010),
http://www.indisputably.org/?p=1346 (stressing the unusual nature of AT&T's arbitration
clause). If the Court limits its holding to the facts of the case, holding that California's
application of the unconscionability doctrine in this kind of arbitration setting is
preempted, the question will remain open whether other, less generous agreements,
would also be preempted.
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agreement. Whether the Supreme Court's decision is "fair" or not
is immaterial. The Court's interpretation of the FAA is that
parties will not be required to participate in class arbitrations
unless they agree to do so, and, most likely, courts will be unable
to create blanket requirements that arbitration agreements that
waive class action arbitration are unenforceable.
Following Concepcion, remedies for consumers with low
value claims will no longer be available through the judicial
system. Thus, consumers and their advocates must turn to
Congress for assistance with this major concern. Unfortunately,
the legislation currently before Congress, the AFA, is overbroad
and creates more problems than it remedies. The next section of
this Article will evaluate the proposed AFA and then offer a more
streamlined and targeted solution to the problems present in
consumer arbitration.
IV. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL TO REFORM ARBITRATION-THE
ARBITRATION FAIRNESS ACT (AFA)
The AFA proposes amendments to the FAA invalidating
predispute arbitration agreements covering an employment,
consumer, or civil rights dispute."' In addition, the amendments
would require a court, rather than an arbitrator, to decide any
dispute regarding the applicability of the FAA as amended (i.e.,
by the AFA) to an arbitration agreement."2
To support the legislation, drafters included a provision
articulating findings about arbitration that would, if true, seem
to justify the draconian measures the legislation proposes.
Among other "findings,""' the drafters emphasized that the FAA
151. Arbitration Fairness Act, S. 987, H.R. 1873, 112th Cong. (2011).
152. Id.
153. In the 2011 introduction, the drafters edited the "findings" section. The new
findings are similar but are abbreviated and considerably toned down. The primary
changes were to eliminate references to the behavior and motivation of corporations
adopting arbitration clauses. In 2011, the findings are as follows:
(1) The Federal Arbitration Act (now enacted as chapter 1 of title 9 of the
United States Code) was intended to apply to disputes between commercial
entities of generally similar sophistication and bargaining power.
(2) A series of decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States have
changed the meaning of the Act so that it now extends to consumer
disputes and employment disputes.
(3) Most consumers and employees have little or no meaningful choice whether
to submit their claims to arbitration. Often, consumers and employees are
not even aware that they have given up their rights.
(4) Mandatory arbitration undermines the development of public law because
there is inadequate transparency and inadequate judicial review of
arbitrators' decisions.
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was intended to apply to disputes between repeat players but has
been extended to agreements between repeat and one-shot
players, such as businesses and consumers.'4  Moreover,
employees have no choice but to accept arbitration clauses
because these clauses are often conditions of purchases or
employment-items about which it is difficult to negotiate.55
(5) Arbitration can be an acceptable alternative when consent to the
arbitration is truly voluntary, and occurs after the dispute arises.
Id.
In 2009, by contrast, the bill contained the following findings:
(1) The Federal Arbitration Act (now enacted as chapter 1 of title 9 of the
United States Code) was intended to apply to disputes between commercial
entities of generally similar sophistication and bargaining power.
(2) A series of United States Supreme Court decisions have changed the
meaning of the Act so that it now extends to disputes between parties of
greatly disparate economic power, such as consumer disputes and
employment disputes. As a result, a large and rapidly growing number of
corporations are forcing millions of consumers and employees to give up
their right to have disputes resolved by a judge or jury, and instead submit
their claims to binding arbitration.
(3) Most consumers and employees have little or no meaningful option whether
to submit their claims to arbitration. Few people realize, or understand the
importance of the deliberately fine print that strips them of rights; and
because entire industries are adopting these clauses, people increasingly
have no choice but to accept them. They must often give up their rights as a
condition of having a job, getting necessary medical care, buying a car,
opening a bank account, getting a credit card, and the like. Often times,
they are not even aware that they have given up their rights.
(4) Private arbitration companies are sometimes under great pressure to
devise systems that favor the corporate repeat players who decide whether
those companies will receive their lucrative business.
(5) Mandatory arbitration undermines the development of public law for civil
rights and consumer rights, because there is no meaningful judicial review
of arbitrators' decisions. With the knowledge that their rulings will not be
seriously examined by a court applying current law, arbitrators enjoy near
complete freedom to ignore the law and even their own rules.
(6) Mandatory arbitration is a poor system for protecting civil rights and
consumer rights because it is not transparent. While the American civil
justice system features publicly accountable decision makers who generally
issue written decisions, arbitration offers none of these features.
(7) Many corporations add to arbitration clauses unfair provisions that
deliberately tilt the systems against individuals, including provisions that
strip individuals of substantive statutory rights, ban class actions, and
force people to arbitrate their claims hundreds of miles from their homes.
While some courts have been protective of individuals, too many courts
have erroneously upheld even egregiously unfair mandatory arbitration
clauses in deference to a supposed Federal policy favoring arbitration over
the constitutional rights of individuals.
Arbitration Fairness Act, S. 931, 111th Cong. (2009).
154. Arbitration Fairness Act, S. 987, H.R. 1873, 112th Cong. (2011).
155. See id. § 2 ("Most consumers and employees have little or no meaningful choice
whether to submit their claims to arbitration."); Arbitration Fairness Act, S. 931, H.R.
1020, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009) ("Most consumers and employees ... must often give up
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Finally, the findings suggest that arbitration is a poor substitute
for litigation because the decisionmakers are largely
unaccountable both because arbitration takes place in private,
and because the decisionmakers are rarely required to issue
written opinions.'5 6
Recent Supreme Court jurisprudence energized AFA
proponents."' Yet a closer examination of the proposed statute
reveals that the legislation focuses on the wrong issues.
Eliminating predispute arbitration agreements signed by
consumers and employees is excessively overbroad."' Even
predictably antiarbitration groups have responded negatively to
the proposed legislation. The three primary critiques,' one from
their rights as a condition of having a job, getting necessary medical care, buying a car,
opening a bank account, getting a credit card, and the like.").
156. Arbitration Fairness Act, S. 987, H.R. 1873, 112th Cong. (2011).
157. See Aryeh Mellman, Lawmakers Respond to Supreme Court Ruling with
Introduction of Arbitration Fairness Act, THE LEADERSHIP CONF. (May 4, 2011),
httpA/www.civilrights.orgarchives/2011/05/1185-arbitration-fairness.html (noting that in light
of the Supreme Court's decision in AT&T v. Concepcion, Senators Al Franken and Richard
Blumenthal were expected to reintroduce the Arbitration Fairness Act); Further Attacks on
Employment Arbitrations, CAL. EMP'T LAW (May 23, 2011),
http://californiaemploymentlaw.foxrothschild.com/tags/arbitration-fairness-act-of-20 (last
visited Sept. 2, 2011) (reporting that Senator Al Franken and others reintroduced the
Arbitration Fairness Act in a move that seemed to respond to the Supreme Court's ruling
in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion).
158. See 0. Russel Murray, Arbitration Fairness Act-Right Problem, Wrong Solution,
THE LEARNED LAw. (Apr. 27, 2009) (stating that the proposed amendment is too broad
because it completely voids all pre-dispute agreements rather than just the one-sided
agreements that lack real consent); E. Gary Spitko, Exempting High-Level Employees and
Small Employers from Legislation Invalidating Predispute Employment Arbitration
Agreements, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 591, 598 (2009) (describing the AFA as "sweeping" and
"too broad" while suggesting ways to reform arbitration legislation with respect to
employment agreements).
159. Many others have criticized the AFA's broad reach. See, e.g., Murray, supra note
158 ("One problem with the AFA's approach to fixing this issue, however, is that the
solution is overbroad. In other words, the proposed cure is worse than the problem it tries
to fix. A narrower solution, and one that avoids throwing out the baby with the bath
water, would be to mandate pre-dispute 'opt-out' rights-give consumers, for example, the
right to opt-out of arbitration at the time of purchase of the product or service."); Am. Bar
Ass'n, Resolution 114, at 13-14 (Aug. 3-4, 2009), http://www.abanet.org/leadership/
2009/annual/daily-journal/One HundredFourteen.doc (examining the AFA and stating
the ABA's official policy of opposition to legislation "that would be inconsistent with
established international commercial arbitration standards"); David L. Gregory
& Edward McNamara, Mandatory Labor Arbitration of Statutory Claims, and the Future
of Fair Employment: 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 419, 457-58
(2010) (stating that despite its benign title, the AFA is "in fact hostile to labor and
employment arbitration," and "a gross overreaction to the proven efficacy and fairness of
labor and employment arbitration"); E. Gary Spitko, Exempting High Level Employees
and Small Employers from Legislation Invalidating Predispute Employment Arbitration
Agreements, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 591, 600 (2009) (stating that the AFA is "too broad,"
and that it should "exempt claims by or against certain high-level employees and claims
by or against certain small employers"); Paul B. Marrow, Determining if Mandatory
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an ADR organization and the other two from academics, will be
discussed here.
The Association of Conflict Resolution (ACR), a group of both
lawyer and non-lawyer mediators "dedicated to enhancing the
practice and public understanding of conflict resolution," issued a
report critiquing the AFA's extreme approach.'6 0 The Report
acknowledged that the AFA's underlying goals, to improve access
to procedure, protect due process, and ensure integrity in the
arbitration process, were important.' Although ACR recognized
that some predispute arbitration agreements created defective
processes, it nevertheless concluded that the "AFA's remedy of
completely prohibiting all such agreements .. . is not required in
order to correct the problems underlying these agreements."'6 2
ACR, not known in the past for its support of mandatory
arbitration or arbitration generally,' identified a number of
potential benefits the arbitration process might have for consumers
and other one-shot players. According to ACR, "[p]re-dispute
Arbitration is "Fair": Asymmetrically Held Information and the Role of Mandatory
Arbitration in Modulating Uninsurable Contract Risks, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 187,
191-92 (2010) (stating that when asymmetrically held information gives rise to risks
that are uninsurable, mandatory arbitration is a "'fair' measure of self-help");
Bradley Dillon-Coffman, Revising the Revision: Procedural Alternatives to the
Arbitration Fairness Act, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1105, 1107 (2010) (explaining that
Congress is "getting it wrong" with the proposed AFA); Press Release, U.S. Chamber
of Commerce, Voters Strongly Back Arbitration, New Poll Shows (Apr. 2,
2008) (quoting Lisa Rickard, President of the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal
Reform, for the proposition that the AFA would eliminate access to a forum for many
consumers and employees).
160. ACR TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 4. These critiques were leveled
against the 2009 Act, which is virtually identical to the 2011 Act (although the Act no
longer exempts franchisees from AFA coverage). Compare Arbitration Fairness Act, S.
987, H.R. 1873, 112th Cong. (2011) with Arbitration Fairness Act, S. 931, H.R. 1020,
111th Cong. (2009). Because the 2011 Act is new, and because it is similar in language,
new critiques are yet to appear.
161. ACR TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 7.
162. Id.
163. In a sense, pre-dispute arbitration agreements, because they do not permit
parties to exercise a knowing and voluntary choice, are inconsistent with the mission and
values of an organization like ACR, whose mission is to give "voice to the choices for quality
conflict resolution" and that "all people know their choices for conflict resolution." See Who We
Are, AssN FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION, http://www.acrnet.org/Page.aspx?id=530 (last visited
Sept. 29, 2011). Although pre-dispute arbitration agreements seem inconsistent with
ACR's mission and vision, ACR has, in other contexts, supported the use of arbitration.
In fact, ACR endorsed the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act in 2006. In approving the
RUAA, ACR emphasized that it is committed to arbitration and will endorse policies
and statutory enactments that support the "fairness and integrity of the arbitration
process." Press Release, Ass'n for Conflict Resolution, ACR Endorses Revised Unif.
Arbitration Act (June 26, 2006), http-/web.archive.org/web/20081013014140/http://
www.acrnet.org/pdfs/ACRRUAADecisionPressReleaseFINAL.pdf (search for ACRNet.org
in the Internet Archive Index) (quoting Richard D. Fincher, ACR Vice-President).
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mandatory arbitration has the potential for developing a fast,
efficient, fair, low-cost dispute resolution process to which all
citizens could gain access and whose procedures and practices
are fair and transparent."" ACR recommended improving the
processes and procedures provided in predispute arbitration
agreements instead of "disenfranchising" one-shot players from
utilizing an "affordable, viable, fair dispute resolution process to
resolve their disputes in a timely manner."' Taking a realistic
approach, ACR recognized that complete elimination of
predispute arbitration processes might, as a practical matter,
result in disenfranchisement of numerous one-shot players.'66
With the courthouse as the only forum for resolution, ACR
emphasized that many parties might not be able to access such a
forum or afford to obtain adequate representation from lawyers
to participate in such a forum."' In addition, without predispute
arbitration processes available, the increased number of cases in
the court system is likely to result in a case load increase, which
further impacts the efficiency of the adjudicatory system.168
Finally, ACR emphasized that the elimination of predispute
arbitration agreements ignores the strides that many
professional organizations and dispute resolution providers have
made to improve the arbitration process.
Arbitration providers adopted consumer due process
protocols to increase fairness in the dispute resolution process, as
well as payment structures for claim filers that take into account
the limited funds most consumers have to spend on a dispute
resolution process."' Rather than throw the baby out with the
bathwater, ACR proposed changes to the FAA that would ensure
a higher level of due process to participants in predispute
arbitration processes, including increased discovery, access to
164. ACR TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 7.
165. Id. at 7, 13-14.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See id. at 7 (noting that in the absence of binding, predispute arbitration
agreements, courts might not be able to administer the projected increases in their
caseloads); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale
of Innovation Co-opted or "The Law ofADR", 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1991) ("In short,
courts try to use various forms of ADR to reduce caseloads and increase court efficiency at
the possible cost of realizing better justice."); Jeffery Wolfe, The Times They Are a
Changin': A New Jurisprudence for Social Security, 29 J. NATL AsS'N ADMIN. L.
JUDICIARY 515, 544-45 (2009) (illustrating that judges' attempts to deal with an ever-
increasing caseload have failed).
169. ACR TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 7-8, 81-82.
170. See Stephen Friedman, Arbitration Provisions: Little Darlings and Little




representation, access to full statutory remedies, written
decisions in higher value cases, arbitrator selection processes
designed to ensure the selection of impartial and independent
arbitrators, and mechanisms for ensuring that the proceedings
are not costly or inconvenient to the one-shot player.'
Criticism emanates from the academy as well. Professor
Amy Schmitz, in her article, Regulation Rash? Questioning the
AFA's Approach for Protecting Arbitration Fairness, charged that
the proposed AFA was potentially "too rash," and advocated
instead a "more measured approach."'7 2 Like ACR, Professor
Schmitz asserted that the need for some reform of arbitration,
particularly in the consumer context, must be balanced against
the importance of avoiding "needless protectionism.""' Although
most consumer advocates and academics have been reluctant to
do so, Professor Schmitz acknowledged that empirical studies of
consumer arbitration, like the 2009 Searle Institute study of AAA
consumer arbitrations, reveal that consumers experience
considerable success in arbitrations when they pursue claims
against a business.'
Quite similar to ACR, Professor Schmitz recommends a more
measured approach. Schmitz's proposal would effectively codify the
Consumer Due Process Protocol. Instead of leaving the due process
question to the parties or the arbitrator provider, Schmitz proposes
to codify concepts like notice of the arbitration clause, balanced
arbitrator selection, contained costs, adequate discovery, convenient
hearing location, preservation of statutory remedies, access to small
claims court, and allowance of class relief.'
Lew Maltby, drafter of a Model Arbitration Act which he
proposes as an alternative to the AFA, codified many of Schmitz's
recommendations. Maltby's Act includes a mandate that consumers
pay limited fees and have a right to a neutral provider and a
written opinion, if requested."' Perhaps more importantly, Maltby's
171. See ACR TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 6-8 (finding the AFA's remedy of
eliminating all pre-dispute arbitration agreements unnecessary and noting that there
have been efforts to improve the fairness and transparency of the arbitration process).
172. Schmitz, supra note 48, at 16.
173. Id. at 19.
174. Id. at 21 (citing SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INST., supra note 23); See Berner & Grow,
supra note 6, at 72 (emphasizing consumers are unlikely to prevail against corporations).
The study stated that consumers were successful in 53.3% of the 301 arbitrations studied
and recovered an average of $19,255 or 52.1% of the damages they sought in those
arbitrations. Id.
175. Id. at 20-29. In addition to the procedures identified above, Professor Schmitz
also recommends codification of timely decisions, compliance with awards, and allowance
for consolidation of claims and joinder of parties. Id. at 26-28.
176. Lew Maltby, Model Arbitration Act (on file with Houston Law Review).
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Act permits consumers access to class action processes when
necessary to vindicate their rights."' While not broad-sweeping in
its application, Maltby's proposal would protect consumers with
low-value claims in those cases where no alternate forum would be
available.'
AFA critics agree that the right answer is not to throw out
predispute arbitration agreements entirely but instead to make
sure that arbitration works as a method for resolving disputes.
ACR and Professor Schmitz attack the AFA on procedural
grounds, attempting to ensure that arbitration of disputes
between one-shot and repeat players takes place in an
environment with sufficient due process.' While codification of
procedural requirements might improve arbitration, the major
arbitration services providers have already adopted the
Consumer Due Process Protocol."'o As a result, most arbitrations
are conducted with the benefit of the enhanced procedural
protections Schmitz advocates above.'"' As Schmitz notes,
however, the Protocol did not address the issue of class relief.1' It
is likely that those negotiating the Protocol were unable to reach
a compromise on this issue because it is so divisive. Failure to
resolve this issue, together with recent Supreme Court
jurisprudence, makes helping litigants aggregate their low-value
claims the major issue in arbitration today. Thus, while I join the
call for a result that preserves consumer arbitration, I propose a
different solution.
177. Maltby's Model Arbitration Act states that, "Class actions may be brought under
circumstances in which they are necessary for the parties to be able to vindicate their
legal rights." Id.
178. Although Maltby's Act addresses the class action waiver problem, I propose a
broader solution so that satellite litigation surrounding the question of whether an
alternate forum is available can be avoided.
179. See Schmitz, supra note 48, at 21 (demonstrating that the AFA's findings are
negative towards arbitrator and arbitration providers because they presume heavy
repeat-player bias); Igor M. Brin, The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 821, 839 (2010) (representing that ACR encourages a uniform act that fully
complies with due process requirements).
180. One of the key findings in the Searle Institute Report was that the vast majority
of consumer arbitration clauses already comply with the Due Process Protocol at the time
the case is filed. SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INST., supra note 23, at 83 (reporting that 76.6% of
arbitration clauses that come before AAA are consistent with the Consumer Due Process
Protocol). In addition, AAA's protocol review identified noncompliance and followed
through with a response to arbitration clauses that contained protocol violations. Id. at
xiv, 89-92. The Report also noted that "more than 150 businesses have either waived
problematic provisions on an ongoing basis or revised arbitration clauses to remove
provisions that violated the Consumer Due Process Protocol" after AAA explained to them
that their clauses did not comply. Id. at xiv.
181. Id. at xiv.
182. Id. at 28.
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V. PROPOSED REVISION OF THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
(FAA)
While calls for a legislative solution to this problem are not
new, the recent Supreme Court decisions raised the stakes for
consumers and their advocates because the decisions virtually
prohibit arbitrators from ordering class processes.8 1 With that in
mind, I propose the following statute:
Section 1: Short Title of Act
This Act shall be known as the "Consumer Class Action
and Class Arbitration Waiver Reform Act."
Section 2: Definitions
(a) "[C]ommerce includes all transactions arising out of
interstate or international commerce;
(b) a consumer is any person who uses, purchases,
acquires, attempts to purchase or acquire, or is offered
or furnished any real or personal property, tangible or
intangible goods, services, or credit for personal, family
or household purposes, and includes passengers and
shippers of goods on common carriers in commerce." 84
Section 3: Prohibition of Class Action and Class Action
Arbitration Waivers in Consumer Arbitration Agreements
An arbitration agreement between a consumer and a
provider of goods or services is invalid to the extent that
it precludes the consumer from accessing the court or
arbitral system to participate in a class action as defined
by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.
This Article posits that this proposed legislation will permit
consumers with low-value claims, who are bound by arbitration
agreements, to pursue class processes in either arbitration or
court. The primary objection to this legislation is likely to be that
companies will no longer use arbitration clauses if they are
required to participate in class arbitrations or class actions in
court. In the briefing leading up to the Concepcion arguments,
counsel and other interested parties vociferously argued that
businesses would give up arbitration entirely if class processes were
183. Both Quebec and Ontario have already invalidated the use of class action
waivers in consumer agreements. The Consumer Protection Act, R.S.Q. 1978 c. P.40.1,
amended by S.Q. 2006, c. 56 s. 11.1 (Can.) and the Consumer Protection Act, R.S.O. 2002,
c. A.30 s. 8(1) (Can.) invalidate provisions that prevent a consumer from commencing or
participating in a class action.
184. Section 2 of this Act is almost identical to Professor Jean Sternlight's proposed
legislation designed to protect consumers' access to court. BRUNET ET AL., supra note 2, at
375 app. C.
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required."' While class processes have significant costs, both for the
corporation sued and often for the parties pursuing them, the idea
that businesses would give up arbitration because of the risk that
they might be required to participate in class arbitration is
laughable.'8 6 In particular, evidence from AAA's administration of
class arbitration claims strongly suggests that class arbitration, if
permitted through legislation, will continue to thrive and provide
another creative avenue through which parties can adjudicate their
disputes. Moreover, the continued use of arbitration in the many
jurisdictions that have prohibited class action waivers in arbitration
agreements offers further support for the belief that businesses will
continue to use arbitration even if class waivers are unenforceable.
A. Businesses Will Continue to Use Arbitration Even if Class
Arbitration and Class Action Waivers Are Unenforceable
Following the Supreme Court's 2003 Bazzle decision, class
arbitration became more common."' Although one would have
185. In its opening brief, AT&T stated that "no rational business will agree" to class wide
arbitration. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 135, at 22. Class arbitration, AT&T
contended, is "a lose-lose proposition" with all the cost and risk of litigation but none of
the procedural protections and appellate oversight. Id. at 53-55. See also Daniel R.
Higginbotham, Buyer Beware: Why the Class Arbitration Waiver Clause Presents a
Gloomy Future for Consumers, 58 DUKE L.J. 103, 122 (2008) (arguing that increased use
of class arbitration will result in businesses reducing their use of arbitration). Of course,
some businesses may prefer to take class actions to court. The benefits and drawbacks of
class actions in court proceedings are well-documented elsewhere, including in articles
examining the pros and cons of class arbitration. See, e.g., Maureen A. Weston, Universes
Colliding: The Constitutional Implications of Arbitral Class Actions, 47 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1711, 1714 (2006) (explaining that the use of the class action procedure for litigation
may motivate parties to bring cases that for economic reasons might not be brought otherwise);
Schwartz, supra note 5, at 1319 ("By aggregating low-cost/low-stakes or high-cost/low-stakes
cases into a single high-cost/high-stakes case, class actions can realize potential process-cost
economies of scale that make them a relatively inexpensive forum for the class
members-both in terms of monetary and information costs."); Thomas Burch, Comment,
Necessity Never Made a Good Bargain: When Consumer Arbitration Agreements Prohibit Class
Relief, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1005, 1027 (2004) (pointing out that many consumers may not
know of their potential claims; in a class action, a single informed consumer will inform all
other class members as per notice); Jeffrey J. Greenbaum & Jason L. Jurkevich, Class
Actions Waivers in Arbitration Agreements: Can They Survive?, CLASS ACTION LITIG.
RPT., Jan. 8, 2010, at 39, 45 ("Companies tend to be averse to class arbitration,
believing that it combines the disadvantages of class action litigation . . . with the
disadvantages of arbitration . . . .").
186. See Jay Tidmarsh, Rethinking Adequacy of Representation, 87 TEx. L. REV.
1137, 1167-68 (2009) (endorsing the idea that claim aggregation creates economic
viability); Dana Lai, Extending the Fraud-on-the-Market Presumption Beyond Basic: A
Case of Poor Analogies and Over-Eager Courts, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1121, 1153-54
(2011) (reasoning that initial class certification costs are expensive).
187. See William K Slate II & Eric P. Tuchmann, Class Action Arbitrations, 11 INT'L
ARB. L. REV. 50 (2008) (illustrating that class arbitrations in the United States began in
2002). Although, as the Concepcion dissenters note, class arbitration is "well known in
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expected businesses to draft language designed to avoid class
arbitration following Bazzle, only some businesses, particularly
credit card and cell phone companies, attempted to implement
class arbitration waivers.' According to the Searle study, in its
sample of 299 AAA arbitrations, only 36.5% of the cases arose out
of arbitration clauses with a class action waiver."' Well over half
of the arbitration clauses did not contain class arbitration
waivers."o At the same time, class action arbitration as an ADR
process grew in popularity. As of January 14, 2011, AAA was
administering over 300 class action arbitrations.'
Businesses who failed to amend their arbitration
agreements to explicitly preclude class arbitration may have
done so out of concern that a court would declare the waiver to be
unenforceable. Alternatively, it may be that businesses do not
find the prospect of participation in class arbitration repugnant.
Or, it may be that, in the circuits rejecting class action waivers as
unconscionable or unenforceable, the corporations who have
continued to use arbitration have done so because their
arbitration policies are driven by the corporation's national
approach to dispute resolution. That is, for a corporation like
AT&T, it may make economic sense to continue a national policy
of implementing consumer arbitration agreements even if, in the
First, Second, and Ninth Circuits, parties are permitted to use
class action processes if certain criteria are met.
Whatever the reason, for the last seven years, businesses
continued to implement arbitration agreements even though they
risked the possibility that an arbitrator would order them to
California and followed elsewhere." AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740,
1758 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
188. See SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INST., supra note 23, at 103. This is not to suggest
that businesses are enthusiastic about class arbitrations. See David S. Clancy
& Matthew M.K. Stein, An Uninvited Guest: Class Arbitration and the Federal
Arbitration Act's Legislative History, 63 Bus. LAW. 55, 62 (2007) (clarifying that class
arbitration is not prompt and inexpensive); Christopher R. Drahozal & Quentin R.
Wittrock, Franchising, Arbitration and the Future of the Class Action, 3
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 275, 286 (2009) (showing that the AAA has had a
"steady flow of class arbitration filings"-around fifty per year-since issuing its
class arbitration rules).
189. SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INST., supra note 23, at 103; Christopher Drahozal
& Samantha Zyontz, Private Regulation of Consumer Arbitration 51 (Univ. of Kan. Sch. of
Law, Working Paper No. 2011-4, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cftn?abstractjid=1904545.
190. SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INST., supra note 23, at 103.
191. According to AAA's searchable class arbitration docket, AAA is currently
administering 307 class arbitration cases. AAA, Searchable Class Arbitration Docket,
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADR.ORG (July 19, 2011), http://www.adr.org/
sp.asp?id=25562.
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participate in a class action arbitration process.'92 In balancing
the costs and benefits of the use of arbitration, then, businesses
appear to prefer arbitration, even with the possibility of class
arbitration, to alternate forms of dispute resolution."' Thus,
concerns about the demise of arbitration, should Congress outlaw
class arbitration waivers, seem overblown.
B. Class Arbitration May Prove to Be a Workable Dispute
Resolution Process
Although the Concepcion court described class arbitration as
"well-known," class arbitration as a dispute resolution process is
in its infancy.'94 Used primarily in California in the 1980s,
following Bazzle, parties increased their use of class arbitration
processes.' In response, AAA and JAMS quickly designed class
arbitration rules to govern these cases. Not surprisingly, these
rules basically mirror Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23,
addressing administration of class action procedures in court."
192. At least some plaintiffs' attorneys perceived a benefit to class action arbitration.
See Joseph Jaramillo, Recent Developments in Class Action Arbitration, CAL. EMP'T LAW. ASS'N,
1 (July 28, 2006), http://www.gdblegal.com/documents/ArticlesAmicusBriefs/
Presentation on Class Arbitrations.pdf ("Class arbitration offers the benefits of the class
action device with potential advantages not present in court litigation. Employers have
less opportunity for delay in arbitration proceedings, where discovery is often limited, as
are the grounds for judicial review. Arbitration providers, such as the American
Arbitration Association ("AAA") and JAMS, have class arbitration rules in place to govern
the process. These rules track Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, and provide standards
for class certification, class notice, and approval of settlements. Thus, class arbitration
can be a viable alternative to class action litigation for employees subject to an
enforceable arbitration agreement."); John H. Quisenberry & Susan Abitanta, Can
Employers Preclude Class Actions Through Mandatory Arbitration Agreements that Are
Silent as to Whether Classes Are Permitted, FORUM, June 2005, at 22, 24-26 (2005)
(stating that classwide arbitration can provide parties with the same benefits as court
class actions and is "available and preferred").
193. Moreover, class arbitration processes could be altered to make them more
cost-effective and efficient, allowing businesses, as well as consumers, to benefit.
Mark Weidemaier, Arbitration and the Individuation Critique, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 69,
100-01 (2007). See Drahozal & Zyontz, supra note 189, at 14 ("[Tlhe Consumer Due
Process Protocol and the JAMS Minimum Standards of Procedural Fairness for
consumer arbitrations permit claimants to bring claims in small claims court rather
than arbitration, even if the claims are subject to a pre-dispute arbitration
agreement.").
194. See id. at 94-99 (stating that class arbitration has potential benefits both for
consumers and businesses); Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (2005)
(noting that classwide arbitration is a "relatively recent development"), abrogated by
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 740 (2011).
195. Drahozal & Zyontz, supra note 189, at 70; see also Keating v. Superior Court,
645 P.2d 1192, 1209 (Cal. 1982) (stating that class arbitration may "offer a better, more
efficient, and fairer solution"), rev'd in part, Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1
(1984).
196. Drahozal & Zyontz, supra note 189, at 94.
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Shortly after Bazzle, and again more recently, commentators
raised a number of potential concerns about class arbitration.9 The
primary criticisms of class arbitration are that it: (1) requires courts
to use a more deferential standard to review class certification
decisions and class arbitration awards than the abuse of
discretion standard used to review trial court decisions;' (2) fails
to protect the rights of the parties involved, at least in comparison
to class actions conducted in court;'99 (3) is an expensive and slow
197. See Clancy & Stein, supra note 188, at 62 (noting class arbitration is neither
prompt nor inexpensive); Daniel R. Higginbotham, Buyer Beware: Why the Class
Arbitration Waiver Clause Presents a Gloomy Future for Consumers, 58 DuKE L.J. 103,
119 (2008) (positing that a legislative prohibition on class arbitration waivers would
create other problems including businesses reducing use of arbitration generally and
providing inadequate procedure to parties in the class). See also Drahozal & Wittrock,
supra note 188, at 287 (stating that evaluation of AAA's class arbitration docket would
have to be done before conclusions about whether class arbitration is an adequate
substitute for class actions could be drawn). Professor Drahozal noted in his statement
before the House Judiciary Committee in 2009 that the next phase of the Searle
Institute's Consumer Arbitration Task Force is to "consider the extent to which class
actions are comparable to the individual arbitrations ... for purposes of developing a
baseline for evaluating the costs, speed, and outcomes of AAA consumer arbitrations."
Federal Arbitration Act: Is the Credit Card Indus. Using It to Quash Legal
Claims?: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Commercial & Admin. Law of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 131 (2009) (statement of Christopher R. Drahozal).
198. Lack of rigorous judicial review was one of the primary objections the
Concepcion majority raised in its opinion. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1752 ("The AAA
rules do authorize judicial review of certification decisions, but this review is unlikely to
have much effect . . ."). The Court expressed concern about imposing excessive risk on
defendants from court-ordered class arbitrations. Id. Other commentators also assert that
class arbitration may be problematic because the standard of review for arbitration
decisions (whether class certification decisions or arbitration awards) will be more
deferential to the award than would the standard for reviewing decisions in court
processes. See Weston, supra note 185, at 1722 (expressing concern that class arbitration
lacks guarantees that nonparticipating members' rights will receive protection-a
protection ensured in court proceedings by judicial review); Clancy & Stein, supra note
188, at 70 (questioning adequacy of judicial review). For example, one critic asserts that
"[ilf the arbitrator's certification decision is subject to review only on FAA section 10
grounds or for 'manifest disregard of the law,' this would create a huge risk for a
defendant: if a single 'renegade arbitrator' certified a questionable class, the defendant
would immediately be threatened with enormous liability." Jack Wilson, "No-Class-Action
Arbitration Clauses," State-Law Unconscionability, and The Federal Arbitration Act: A
Case for Federal Judicial Restraint and Congressional Action, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 737,
778 (2004). But see Note, Classwide Arbitration: Effective Adjudication or Procedural
Quagmire?, 67 VA. L. REV. 787, 805-09 (1981) (arguing that deferential review of class
arbitration award does not present an "insurmountable obstacle[ I"). One would expect
that the application of the arbitral standard of review would result in the more frequent
affirmance of the arbitrator's decision regarding class certification than would an
appellate court's review of a lower court's certification decision because the standard is
more deferential to the arbitrator's decision. Because class arbitrators have decided few
cases, however, concerns about the standard of review have not emerged.
199. See Weston, supra note 185, at 1769-72 (discussing what process is due to class
litigants). Some commentators suggest that the interaction between the courts and the
arbitrator in the class arbitration process triggers state action and thus requires that
class arbitrations satisfy due process requirements. Note, supra note 198, at 801 (stating
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process;200 and (4) provides an arbitrator selection mechanism
that is inadequate.20 '
While the Concepcion majority and commentators express
concern about these issues, as a practical matter, it appears that
none of these potential concerns have come to fruition. AAA's
website is home to the most comprehensive class arbitration data.202
AAA reports that it has enjoyed a steady number of class
arbitration filings since 2003. The data show that claimants filed
approximately fifty class arbitration cases per year, dropping to
thirty-six in 2007.203 During that time period, arbitrators issued
only ten class certification decisions.204 It is not known whether
these decisions were appealed. Of the remaining cases, most have
settled or been withdrawn.205 Only eleven cases reached the
that judiciary involvement in class wide arbitration may trigger state action). In
addition, critics are concerned about how and when prospective class members
receive notice and whether they receive adequate representation during the class
arbitration process. Id. at 799, 804. Several jurisdictions ordering parties to participate
in class arbitration have required substantial judicial supervision in order to ensure that
the rights of individuals participating in the process, or who are entitled to participate in
the process, are protected. Among other things, courts have required supervision over
issues such as whether arbitration is appropriate, how arbitrators will be selected,
adequacy of representation, class certification, notice, and discovery. See Keating v.
Superior Ct., 645 P.2d 1192, 1209-10 (Cal. 1982) (stating that court-ordered class
arbitration could be appropriate "if properly administered and judiciously applied,"
though it would involve "a greater degree of judicial involvement than is normally
associated with arbitration," including court supervision over class certification,
notice, and potential settlements); Dickler v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 596
A.2d 860, 866 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (stating that the trial court would have to certify
the class, oversee notice, and conduct a final review to "insure that class
representatives adequately provide for absent class members," and discussing the
potential complications in selecting an arbitrator if there is no trial court
supervision); Cruz v. Pacificare Health Sys., Inc., 99 P.3d 1157, 1166-67 (Cal.
2003) (recognizing class arbitration as a "means of bringing collective legal action by
parties bound to an arbitration agreement" and suggesting it would be appropriate
for courts to supervise "the equitable distribution of assets resulting from a class
recovery"); Izzi v. Mesquite Country Club, 231 Cal. Rptr. 315, 321-22 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986) (stating that courts must supervise class arbitration to "safeguard the rights of
absent class members to adequate representation" and that class arbitration is appropriate in
this situation because of the small per-member claim "based on a standardized document
subject to common proof" and the significant potential for punitive damages).
200. See Clancy & Stein, supra note 188, at 62 (arguing that arbitration is not
prompt, inexpensive, or streamlined).
201. See Weston, supra note 185, at 1772-73 (raising concerns about the
arbitrator-selection process; specifically, that the absent class members are excluded
from the selection process).
202. See Comprehensive ADR, AM. ARBITRATION AsS'N, http://adr.org/si.asp?id=4458
(last visited Aug. 20, 2011).
203. Drahozal & Wittrock, supra note 188, at 286 (reporting data obtained through
authors' searching of AAA's website and other research).
204. Slate & Tuchmann, supra note 187, at 53.
205. See id. (reporting that from Oct. 8, 2003 to Jan. 1, 2008, 54 cases have settled
and 16 cases have been withdrawn).
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award stage, and none of those awards were on the merits.2 06 The
Supreme Court relied on these statistics to conclude that the
class arbitration process is slower, more costly, and more likely to
result in procedural formality than bilateral arbitration.2 07 yet
the evidence the Court provided seems to reveal little about class
arbitration as a process. The absence of class arbitration awards
may establish that business defendants are being "pressured into
settling questionable claims," or it may be evidence that the
defendants did not believe pursuing the claim to resolution was
worthwhile.208 In the absence of an empirical study, neither the
Court nor critics of the decision can be certain of the result. While
this is not an argument that the Court's or other commentators'
criticisms are invalid, it is a practical point-based on existing
data, concerns about the viability of class arbitration as a dispute
resolution process seem to be overstated.2 09
Moreover, if Congress chooses to abandon the proposed
AFA and replace it with legislation designed to preserve
individuals' rights to proceed through class arbitration or class
actions in court, many of the current critiques of class
arbitration would be eliminated as potential bases for attack
on the class arbitration process. Ultimately, Congress could
choose to outlaw class arbitration and allow individuals bound
to arbitration agreements to proceed with class processes in
court. If, instead, Congress chose to permit class arbitration, it
might provide greater definition and clarification of the
relationship between courts and arbitrators during the class
206. Id. (reporting that in 2003, 6 cases were filed; in 2004, 65 cases; in 2005, 47
cases; in 2006, 58 cases; and in 2007, 41 cases).
207. The Court stated:
As of September 2009, the AAA had opened 283 class arbitrations. Of those, 121
remained active, and 162 had been settled, withdrawn, or dismissed. Not a
single one, however, had resulted in a final award on the merits.... For those
cases that were no longer active, the median time from filing to settlement,
withdrawal, or dismissal-not judgment on the merits-was 583 days, and the
mean was 630 days.
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1751 (2011). The dissent emphasized
that the proper comparison is not class arbitration to bilateral arbitration but class
arbitration to class litigation, and under that comparison, class arbitration would be
considerably more efficient. Id. at 1759 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 1752.
209. One would expect that potential defendants to class action arbitration, should it
be mandated, will devise mechanisms to improve the process from their perspective. For
example, arbitration clauses might more frequently require reasoned awards, including
findings of fact or conclusions of law or broader standards of review. See Carole J.
Buckner, Due Process in Class Arbitration, 58 FLA. L. REV. 185, 255-56, 260 (2006)
(suggesting an approach for defendants that combines the pure arbitral model of class
arbitration with a voluntary due process protocol, which would provide due process
protection without regard to judicial involvement in the class arbitration).
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arbitration process. These efforts would help legitimize the
class arbitration process as a viable dispute resolution
mechanism and address some of the criticisms of the class
arbitration process.
C. Impact on Arbitration of the Availability of Judicial Class
Processes
If the legislation proposed in this Article were to be enacted,
corporations could, of course, choose to defend class actions in
court rather than in arbitration. To avoid that possibility, it
seems likely that businesses would continue to make individual
arbitration more attractive to consumers and/or make small
claims court options available, as AT&T did for the
Concepcions.210 Alternatively, businesses could participate in
consumer class actions in court for those disputes the business is
unable to resolve through other processes (such as mediation or
individual arbitration).
Evidence from empirical analysis of corporations with
arbitration clauses reveals two things: (1) arbitration generally
benefits consumers with higher value claims, as well as
corporations; and (2) in jurisdictions that have declared class action
waivers unconscionable, corporations continue to use arbitration
agreements. While corporations would obviously prefer not to
participate in class actions, an effort to educate consumers about
the benefits of arbitration, together with continuing efforts to
ensure the fairness of consumer arbitration for consumers, ought to
reduce the risk that corporations will frequently be confronted with
class actions either in court or in arbitration.
VI. CONCLUSION
Unquestionably, businesses would prefer to avoid class
processes when possible. Class processes are time consuming and
often expensive. At the same time, precluding litigants with
small claims from accessing a forum where they can effectively
vindicate their rights is problematic. As the Concepcion
dissenters emphasized, no rational lawyer will represent a
consumer for the possibility of fees stemming from a $30.22
claim."' The dissenters, quoting a Seventh Circuit decision, said,
210. Three major cell phone providers currently maintain a small-claims court carve
out and include a severability clause that would send a class action to court, rather than
arbitration, if a court holds the class waiver unenforceable. Sprint Terms, supra note 20;
T-Mobile Terms, supra note 20; Verizon Agreement, supra note 20.
211. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1761 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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"'[t]he realistic alternative to a class action is not 17 million
individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only a lunatic or a
fanatic sues for $30."'212 To the extent that the opponents of
arbitration are winning the public relations war (and, at this
point, winning the policy war against arbitration through the
creation of a federal agency that may eliminate arbitration in the
consumer financial services industry), this may be an opportune
time to reform arbitration in a way that preserves the benefits of
arbitration generally, while, at the same time, ensures that
litigants are provided an opportunity to have their claims heard
in some forum. Arbitration fairness should not mean the
elimination of arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism.
Instead, arbitration reform should focus on enabling consumers
to vindicate their rights, whether in individual or class settings.
212. Id. (quoting Carnegie v. Household Int'l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004)).
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